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1 Introduction 
 
[M]ost large forced dislocations of people do not occur in conditions of armed conflict or 
genocide but in routine, everyday evictions to make way for development projects … Indeed, this 
‘development cleansing’ may well constitute ethnic cleansing in disguise, as the people dislocated 
so often turn out to be from minority ethnic and racial communities.    
  - Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal
1
 
[I]mpoverishment and disempowerment have been the rule rather than the exception with 
respect to resettled people around the world.      
   - World Commission on Dams
2
 
1.1 The development displacement dilemma 
In the name of development, every year millions of people throughout the world lose their 
homes, their livelihoods, their communities.    This, of course, is not the intended 
consequence. Development projects are generally embraced to promote human well-being –   
to provide inter alia better access to food, water, shelter and employment.
3
 In many parts of 
the world this is arguably essential just to help meet basic needs.  However, for many of those 
living in the path of  planned dams, power stations, mines, highways, logging operations and 
urban renewal schemes, somewhat ironically, these projects will more likely than not leave 
them impoverished, if not destitute, as the above citation indicates.    A major study of 
displacement worldwide caused by infrastructure projects has found that most people living 
‘in the way’ are forced from their homes and off their lands with no real choice in the matter, 
and in many cases accompanied by intimidation and violence.
4
  The study found relocation 
sites are often selected without regard to livelihood opportunities, with severe consequences 
for the displaced: 
                                                 
1
 Rajagopal (2001)  A19. 
2
 Bartolome (et al) (2000)  7 (‘WCD Displacement Report’). 
3
 De Wet (2009) 79. 
4
 WCD Displacement Report 12-14. 
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For a vast majority of the indigenous/tribal peoples displaced by big projects the experience 
has been extremely negative in cultural, economic and health terms.  The outcomes have 
included assetlessness, unemployment, debt-bondage, hunger, and cultural disintegration.  
For both indigenous and non-indigenous communities, studies show that displacement has 
disproportionately impacted on women and children.
5
 
 
Indigenous people are disproportionately represented among those forcibly displaced, 
sometimes the result of racist agendas, as the opening citation indicates.
6
  Other vulnerable 
groups are also disproportionately represented, but overall numbers of those affected each 
year are not really known.  It has been estimated between 40 and 80 million people have been 
displaced globally by dam construction alone,
7
 while each year between 10 and 15 million 
people are believed to be displaced by development projects of various descriptions.
8
  
However, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) found a “painful irony, and possible 
design, in the fact that there are no reliable official statistics of the number of people 
displaced”; where numbers are given “underestimation of the figures is the norm rather than 
the exception”.9  In a World Bank-funded project in Pakistan (‘Pakistan Project’), for 
example, the Bank’s Inspection Panel found more than 50 villages had been wrongly 
excluded from the list of those affected.
10
 
 
The forcible displacement of people and communities is, arguably, one of the most 
controversial issues related to infrastructure projects, particularly in developing countries.
11
 
While losses for  those displaced by ‘development’ can be as severe as for people forced to 
flee conflict,
12
 the plight of the former is often viewed in very different terms.  Backed by 
                                                 
5
 Ibid 6. 
6
 See also Oliver-Smith (2009b) 143. 
7
 WCD Displacement Report  1. 
8
 See Oliver-Smith (2009a) 3; Robinson (2003)  3. 
9
 WCD Displacement Report  1. 
10
 Inspection Panel, Pakistan – National Drainage Program Project Investigation Report  (2006)  xx, xxviii 
(‘Pakistan Report’). 
11
 Oliver Smith (2009a) 3. 
12
 Robinson (2003) 1. 
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international norms that grant the state the right to take property in the ‘national interest,’13  
officially their removal is deemed legitimate - a sacrifice by the few for the ‘greater good’ of 
the country.
14
   And yet, through this prism, in some developing countries the ‘few’ have not 
been recognised as people whose rights to land, resources and community are being stripped.  
The WCD found the displaced were often viewed as requiring “rehabilitation, not 
empowerment, for there is no recognition of their disenfranchisement”.15 Thus, while forcible 
acquisition of property is legally sanctioned, until recently many developing countries did not 
have comprehensive legal frameworks governing the process of displacement itself.
16
  
Perhaps not surprisingly then, many reports have documented poorly-financed and 
implemented resettlements
17
 or cases where little or no provision has been made for the 
displaced.
18
  
International community implicated 
People forced to abandon their homes and livelihoods by development projects thus pose a 
serious challenge to the international human rights system.  Even when a project is clearly 
justified in the public interest, if people are not adequately resettled and their earning capacity 
and communities restored then their rights are seriously violated.
19
  The international 
community itself has been implicated through institutions like the World Bank
20
 (Bank) that 
has funded many of these “development disasters”.21   Indeed from its earliest days, the Bank 
– a public institution with a mandate of poverty alleviation, owned by its 187 member 
countries –  has come under fire over its apparent disregard of human rights and other social 
impacts of its projects.  The Bank’s role in involuntary resettlement in particular has been 
seen as critical given the sheer numbers of mostly poor people affected by Bank-funded  
                                                 
13
 Ibid  4. 
14
 WCD Displacement Report 3; Penz (2002) 4-5. 
15
 WCD Displacement Report  3-4. 
16
 Roquet and Durocher (2006) 11. 
17
 See eg. Inspection Panel India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project Investigation Report (2005) (‘Mumbai 
Report’); Clark, Fox and Treakle (2003); Cernea (2009) 50; WCD Displacement Report. 
18
 See eg. Johnston (2009) 201-224. 
19
 Pettersson (2002) 17. 
20
 Created at the end of WWII, the World Bank is a financial institution with a mission to provide loans and 
credits to developing countries.  It comprises two public lending arms  - the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA); this is the 
meaning of the `Bank´ used in this thesis.  
21
 See eg. Johnston (2009) 201 -204. 
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projects, and what is seen as its “pivotal role in determining investments, institutional 
development and public policy in developing countries”.22  
 
The Bank did eventually respond to the critics and, indeed, its response was pioneering; in 
1980 the Bank became the first development agency to adopt a comprehensive policy on 
involuntary resettlement.
23
  This was one of a number of binding Bank policies that 
collectively became known as the ‘safeguard policies’.25  The Involuntary Resettlement policy 
marked a significant change in the Bank’s approach to projects, with resettlement to be treated 
as an integral, rather than peripheral, feature of planning and execution.
26
    
 
Nonetheless, serious problems persisted and indeed the guidelines did little to increase 
accountability; local people still had no recourse even when their rights were trampled in 
violation of the policies.   The Sardar Sarovar dam project in India – which involved the 
eviction of hundreds of thousands of people in the 1980s - was a case in point, but this time 
local and international opposition combined to pressure the Bank to agree to the first-ever 
independent review of one of its projects.   The subsequent Morse Commission found the 
Bank had knowingly violated its safeguard policies and tolerated violations of loan covenants, 
resulting in serious harm for the displaced.
27
   The Commission was something of a turning 
point -  not only did it lead to the Bank’s withdrawal from the project, it  led to irresistible 
pressure on the Bank  for  accountability mechanisms to respond to concerns of affected  
people.
28
  The following year the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors authorised creation of 
an investigative body that was to have a certain degree of independence in examining  public 
complaints.  The Inspection Panel began operating in 1994 - an event hailed as a “remarkable 
advancement in international law”.29    
 
                                                 
22
 Treakle (undated).  
23
 Operational Manual Statement 2.33. 
25
 Clark (2008)  628. 
26
  Rew, Fisher and Pandey (2000)  88. 
27
 Morse and  Berger (1992)  (‘Morse Commission’). 
28
 See Clark, Fox and Treakle (2003) 2-9. 
29
 Hunter and Udall (1994). 
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1.2 Research questions 
Significant as these developments have been, the question arises:  just how well do the Bank’s 
Involuntary Resettlement policy and accountability mechanism meet the requirements of 
international human rights law?   Do they provide a solid foundation for ensuring people 
forced from their homes through ‘development’ are treated with dignity, in full respect of 
their human rights?  Further, does the Bank’s policy translate into field practice that meets 
international standards?     This thesis, thus, sets out to examine the following questions: 
• Is the World Bank’s policy on involuntary resettlement consistent with international 
human rights law? 
    • Is the Inspection Panel process in line with international standards? 
• Does the Bank’s current field practice on involuntary resettlement accord with 
international human rights law? 
The guidelines to be examined are Operational Policy 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement  (OP 
4.12) that is backed up by  Bank Procedures 4.12.
30
  The Inspection Panel process is outlined 
in chapter four,  while the parameters of ‘current field practice’ are discussed in the next 
section.     A subsidiary question to this research is whether the Bank is required by 
international law to abide by human rights law.  It’s beyond the scope of this thesis to 
examine this question in depth, but it is an important initial consideration as there are 
potentially far-reaching implications for the Bank in this area if indeed compliance is legally 
required. 
 
These research questions are important on a number of levels.   Firstly, each year millions of 
people are affected by the Bank’s policy and practice in relation to involuntary resettlement.  
An inventory in 1999 of Bank projects found 2.6 million people were affected by resettlement 
programmes.
31
  The figures are only likely to have increased with renewed Bank emphasis on 
loans for infrastructure projects.
32
  While protecting human rights related to development-
forced resettlement is primarily a state duty, international financial institutions are also seen 
                                                 
30
 The Bank policy format comprises binding Operational Policies (OPs) and Bank Procedures (BPs) and advisory 
Good Practices (GPs). The Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement policy has been revised numerous times since 1980; 
OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement came into operation in December 2001.  
31
 Clark (2002) 212.  
32
 Fountain (2005). 
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as having responsibilities, as will be discussed below.    Compounding this issue is the Bank’s 
enormous influence in this field with its policy being used internationally as a model – by 
regional development banks, donors and some countries.
33
   
 
Secondly, despite having had a policy for decades, the Bank’s involvement with involuntary 
resettlement generally has been problematic. Ten years ago  one observer described it as a 
“well-documented failure”.34  Is this still the case?  Shining a human rights lens on the policy 
and recent field practice may provide some insight, while - within limits noted below – also 
provide a current review of both the Bank’s practice in relation to involuntary resettlement, 
and trends in the Inspection Panel’s jurisprudence in this area. 
 
Thirdly, the Bank is part of the United Nations (UN) system, a primary goal of which is to 
promote human rights.  The UN has laboriously devised a set of minimum standards for the 
respect of human dignity.  It is only logical and reasonable these are the standards the Bank 
should follow. It is thus important to establish if its policy sets the bar at an internationally-
acceptable level and its practice follows suit.  
  
Finally, the question is critical for the Bank’s credibility.  In recent years, the Bank has 
recognised the importance of human rights for achieving its goal of sustainable 
development.
35
  It thus makes demands on governments over transparency and accountability.   
It’s therefore relevant to determine if the Bank practices what it preaches.  
 
1.3 Method and  sources 
This study essentially involves applying a normative standard  (international human rights 
law)  to an empirical reality - the Bank’s policy, complaints system and field practice.  The 
normative standard – the law relevant to involuntary resettlement - is primarily established 
using traditional legal methods of interpretation of the main human rights treaties, 
declarations, General Comments of the treaty bodies, as well as soft law documents.   The 
empirical reality was established primarily through analysis of   primary and secondary 
sources, including Bank documents and Panel investigation reports.   While the research 
                                                 
33
 Roquet and Durocher (2006) 11. 
34
 Clark (2002) 206. 
35
 World Bank (1998a). 
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questions are primarily normative, the study includes an institutional analysis from a human 
rights perspective, thus it also necessarily involves other disciplines such as  political science.  
 
Particular mention needs to be made regarding the method of establishing the Bank’s ‘current 
field practice’ involving involuntary resettlement.  This was primarily established through the 
lens of the Inspection Panel; all its case reports from the past six years involving involuntary 
resettlement (listed in Annex A) were examined with the aim of identifying recurring themes. 
Focus was placed on these reports as the Panel’s investigations are generally considered 
thorough and credible, and are the most comprehensive independent source of information 
available. The six-year period was chosen as this indicates more recent Bank practices in the 
field, keeping in mind many of the projects reported on by the Panel during this period date 
back some years before 2005.  These reports were supplemented by other material including 
management reports, NGO reports and newspaper articles.  
 
1.4 Limitations  
This study has two key limitations.  Firstly, its assessment of Bank ‘field practice’ is limited 
to Inspection Panel cases.  These cases cannot be said to necessarily reflect overall Bank 
practice as these are simply cases where complainants have had the skills and resources to file 
complaints – they could reflect the tip of the iceberg or only  problem cases. Nevertheless, it’s 
evident from the reports that the Panel investigations are thorough and it’s contended the 
Panel’s experience over 17 years does enable some insights into recurring issues, particularly 
when viewed in light of other Bank and external materials. 
 
Secondly, this study covers considerable territory – examining the Bank’s policy, complaint 
system, field practice and possible legal obligations.  Each of these areas could have been 
examined in far more depth but the discussion is restricted by space limitations. Thus, for 
example, this paper aims in chapter three to provide a concise outline of the law relating to 
this area, rather than a comprehensive overview, and can only touch on implications of any 
legal obligations. Nevertheless it’s hoped the analysis helps provide some insight into the  
Bank’s conformity with  human rights law relating to  involuntary resettlement, and its 
acceptance, or otherwise, of any legal duties in this area.  
  9 
 
1.5 Structure 
The introductory chapter aims to provide the sociological context to this thesis, as well as the 
historical context to the Bank’s policy and practice on involuntary resettlement.  Chapter two 
provides an international legal context to the study by examining whether the Bank has 
binding  human rights obligations. It also traces the evolution of the Bank’s own view on the 
matter as a point of departure and context for its policy and practice.  Chapters three, four and 
five are the core of this thesis, respectively analysing the Bank’s policy, complaint system  
and  field practice pertaining  to involuntary resettlement in light of  human rights law.  
Chapter six seeks to draw some overall conclusions and briefly touches on ramifications for 
the Bank given the legal context. 
  10 
 
 
2 The reach of  human rights law: is the Bank in or out? 
 
The question of whether the World Bank has obligations under international human rights law 
is in some senses quite a remarkable one to be asking in 2011.  It’s more than 60 years since 
the Bank was founded.   Human rights law, of course, has developed considerably since the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights  (UDHR) in 1948 but it’s noteworthy that after so 
many decades of operations, the Bank’s legal framework is still a matter of debate.  Perhaps 
even more remarkable – or concerning - is the fact that it’s not a question the Bank itself has 
appeared interested in addressing, despite (or perhaps because of)  the potentially profound 
implications for its work.  This chapter will analyse this question but, first, it will examine the 
Bank’s perspective on this issue. 
 
2.1 The view from the Bank 
It is not easy to find a clear position by the Bank on its legal obligations in relation to 
international human rights law.   This ‘view from the Bank,’ therefore, provides a snapshot of 
the Bank’s evolving attitude to human rights issues generally.   This, in itself, sheds some 
light on why the Bank appears reluctant to more directly address the question of its possible 
rights’ obligations. 
 
[T]o some of our shareholders the very mention of the words human rights is inflammatory 
language. It’s getting into areas of politics … [instead] we talk the language of economics 
and development.
36
 
 
This 2004 comment by former Bank President, James Wolfensohn, captures the cautious and 
somewhat ambiguous approach to human rights that has been reflected in more formal actions 
                                                 
36
 Wolfensohn (2005) 21. 
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and writings by the Bank on its legal position.   From its early days, the Bank took the 
position that as a financial institution - barred by its charter from involvement in “political 
affairs” and required to consider only “economic” factors in decision-making - human rights 
had little relevance to its work, let alone being matters giving rise to legal obligations.   In the 
1960s, insisting on its apolitical character, the Bank defied successive UN General Assembly 
resolutions urging it to cease lending to Portugal and South Africa due to their respective 
colonial and apartheid policies.
37
  The oft-cited political prohibition argument  is based on 
Article IV section 10 of the Bank’s  founding instrument - its Articles of Agreement (Articles) 
- which state: 
 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor 
shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or 
the members concerned.  Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their 
decisions…  
 
This is reinforced by Article III, section 5(b).   The Bank’s purpose as set out in Article 1 
essentially is to promote development in member countries.    The terms “political”, 
“economic” and “development” are not defined in the Articles and this inter alia has enabled 
the Bank considerable flexibility in interpreting its charter.
38
  
 
Before looking more closely at how the Bank has interpreted its mandate, it’s worth briefly 
considering the evolution in Bank activities that drew ever more controversy to the Bank over 
human rights.   When its original ‘economic growth’ model struggled in the 1950s and ’60s to 
successfully address the problems of the poor,  the Bank turned to a more direct focus on  
poverty alleviation, with programming including  policy lending and governance reforms.
39
    
These activities had obvious rights dimensions and concerns were soon raised about the 
                                                 
37
  See Bleicher (1970). 
38
 Bradlow (1996) 55-56. 
39
 Ibid; see also Shihata (1991)  111-112. 
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rights’ impacts40 – and Bank accountability for such.  Meanwhile, more traditional projects 
such as dam building had been raising concerns of their own.
41
     
 
In 1990 the Bank’s Legal Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, provided some clarity on the Bank’s 
position in a legal opinion which included a key statement on human rights.
42
   This was 
followed in 1995 by a legal memorandum
43
 that expanded on the earlier opinion.  In essence, 
the Shihata opinions, and his other writings,
44
 offered a conservative interpretation of the 
Bank’s mandate to confront the human rights’ dimensions of its work.   First, he took pains to 
emphasise the Bank’s “impressive” record in promoting social and economic rights by inter 
alia “combating disease, malnutrition, illiteracy”.45 This, however, was not expressed in any 
terms implying a legal obligation to do so.   ‘Civil and political’ rights were seen through 
another prism; generally these rights were not seen as a legitimate area of consideration for 
the Bank unless they had a “direct and obvious” impact on relevant economic matters.  Thus, 
‘political’  human rights could be taken into account “if they are so pervasive and repugnant 
to the point of clearly affecting the country’s investment climate and economic 
performance”.47   Exceptions were also acknowledged for Security Council resolutions 
(arising from the Bank’s agreement with the UN)  and  where the Bank required participation 
of affected people in the design and implementation of projects.  
 
Clearly, defining the boundaries of permissible human rights considerations under these 
guidelines was not a science and their restrictive nature and ambiguity were widely 
criticised.
49
  Crucially, too, the opinions studiously avoided  the question of  Bank 
responsibility for harms resulting from its projects.  The legal opinions, and the Wolfensohn 
quote above, point to a strong resistance within the Bank culture at the time to view human 
                                                 
40
 See Bradlow (1996) 58-59. 
41
 See eg. Morse Commission.  
42
 Shihata (1990).   
43
 Shihata (1995). 
44
 See eg. Shihata (1991). 
45
 Ibid  133. 
47
 Shihata (1995) 234-235. 
49
 See Horta (2002) 227-243;  Bradlow (1996) 61-62;  Broding (2001). 
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rights as international legal entitlements; rather, as one commentator put it, they were seen as 
“mired in ideology and selectivity”.50   
 
Nonetheless, the Bank’s approach to human rights has evolved considerably during the past 
15 years.  Not only has there been greater willingness to “mention the ‘R’ word which is 
‘rights’”,51  broader concepts of development, with human rights at their core, have been 
embraced.  In 1998 the Bank released a major report acknowledging that “creating the 
conditions for the attainment of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of 
development”.52  In 2006 the Bank’s then Legal Counsel, Roberto Danino, issued his own 
legal opinion, stressing the importance of human rights for “helping the Bank achieve its 
mission”.53  Indeed, the manner in which the Bank’s mission was now understood made 
“consideration of human rights essential”.54   
 
The opinion, though, continued to narrowly confine the relevance of human rights to the 
Bank.   It stressed that the Bank may assist member countries fulfill their human rights 
obligations, and should take human rights into account where violations had an economic 
impact.  Rights were also relevant where policies required public participation. But the 
opinion stressed the Bank’s role was “not that of an enforcer of human rights obligations . . . 
Rather the Bank’s role remains one of supportive cooperation with its members in the 
realisation of human rights”.55   Thus, the Bank had a responsibility to stay engaged unless 
where  “violations of human rights reach pervasive proportions, the Bank . . . can no longer 
achieve its purposes”.56  Notably, again, the opinion did not seek to analyse whether the Bank 
itself may have human rights obligations to the poor it seeks to deliver from poverty. In this 
regard it was no more progressive than its predecessors.    
 
                                                 
50
 Clapham (2006) 139. 
51
 Wolfensohn (2005)  22. 
52
 World Bank (1998a) 2 . 
53
 Danino (2006)  3 (`Danino Opinion’). 
54
 Ibid  4. 
55
 Ibid  8. 
56
 Ibid.  
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Danino’s successor, Ana Palacio, has also adopted a similar approach – supporting the idea of 
further incorporating human rights into the Bank’s work, but stressing this was not out of any 
legal obligation: “[The Danino Opinion] is ‘permissive’, allowing, but not mandating, action 
on the part of the Bank in relation to human rights.”57  The next section will begin to explore 
whether this ‘view from the Bank’ is legally justified. 
 
2.2.  Does the Bank have ‘personality’? 
The question arises - is the Bank’s most recent approach to human rights issues legally 
sound?  Is it correct to say while the Bank may be permitted to consider all human rights if 
relevant to its lending decisions, and should help countries which request assistance in 
meeting their rights’ obligations, the Bank itself is not subject to mandatory obligations? 
 
The inquiry into this issue first needs to establish whether the Bank has an international legal 
personality capable of being a holder of rights and duties under international law.
58
  
Traditionally, only States were seen as subjects of international law, that is possessors of 
‘international legal personality’.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has indicated, 
however, that other entities may possess this status if they are capable of operating 
independent of their members.
60
  The Bank was created by states through the entry into force 
of its Articles of Agreement as a treaty in accordance with international law.
61
  The Articles do 
not explicitly confer international legal personality.  Case law indicates, therefore, the 
necessity to look to the powers and functions of the institution and other evidence of a 
“capacity to operate on an international plane”.62   In the Bank’s case, its capacity to enter into 
agreements governed by international law, the immunities and privileges provided under the 
Articles,
63
  provisions in the Articles regarding its relationship with other international 
                                                 
57
 Palacio (2006) 2.  
58
 Janis (1993) 176. 
60
 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion)  [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 
179 (‘Reparations Case’).  
61
 Skogly (2003)  46. 
62
 Reparations Case 179. 
63
 See  IBRD Articles of Agreement, Section 3, Art. VII; see also Reparations Case 179.  
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organisations
64
 and provisions evidencing an entity that operates separate from its members
65
 
indicate it does have  international legal personality.
66
 
 
This means the Bank is bound by international law.  As the ICJ has stated, an international 
organisation, as a subject of international law, is “bound by any obligations incumbent upon 
them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international 
agreements to which they are parties”.67   The Bank, thus, is required to carry out its mandate 
in full compliance with international law, including international human rights law.
68
 Indeed, 
the Bank has explicitly acknowledged this in its own environmental assessment 
‘Sourcebook’: “The World Bank, an organization created and governed by public 
international law, undertakes its operations in compliance with applicable public international 
law principles and rules.”69  
 
2.3    Bank as a Specialised Agency  
The Bank is a specialised agency of the UN by virtue of a relationship agreement
70
 entered 
into in accordance with Articles 57 and  63 of the UN Charter.  Does this give rise to 
obligations to respect the fundamental purposes of the UN as they pertain to  human rights?
71
  
 
 The Relationship Agreement does grant the Bank significant independence.  In part, Article 
1(2) states: “By reason of the nature of its international responsibilities, the Bank is, and is 
required to function as, an independent organization.”  However, as Darrow points out there 
are “degrees of independence”, and the agreement sets out areas of co-operation as well as 
express provisions requiring the Bank to abide by Security Council resolutions.
72
  Skogly 
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argues it’s logical part of the purpose in forging formalised relationships between the 
specialised agencies and the UN must have been to grant them both rights and obligations in 
relation to the UN, with a minimum level of obligation not to contravene the principles and 
purposes of the UN Charter.
73
     Therefore, the Bank’s ‘independence’ is from interference 
by the UN, not from international law as represented in the UN Charter.  Thus, its 
independent status should not be interpreted to alleviate the obligation of the Bank to observe 
the principles and purposes of the UN pertaining to human rights.
74
   
 
2.4   Obligations arising from members’ duties 
A further possible source of obligation for the Bank arises from responsibilities of  member 
governments which have taken on  human rights obligations by ratifying the UN Charter and 
other rights treaties.  In regard to members’ obligations arising from the UN Charter (under 
Articles 1(3), 55 and 56),
75
 these will take precedence over other duties under international 
law by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter.  
 
Although the Charter obligations are general, it’s been argued the UDHR gives an 
authoritative interpretation of the Charter-based obligations
76
 (see further discussion below).   
Debtor states will be required to carry out their development programmes in a manner that 
respects and promotes their peoples’ rights in line with their treaty obligations.    For the Bank 
it means, at the least, it should not act in a manner that would facilitate a breach of those 
obligations.
77
   Indeed, the Bank in its environmental policy undertakes not to operate in a 
manner that would breach a member’s environmental treaty obligations;78 the same principle 
is clearly appropriate for human rights obligations that are no less binding than environmental 
treaties.
79
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2.5   Implications of obligations 
So what does all this mean for the Bank?  If it does have human rights obligations, what is the 
scope of these obligations?   International human rights obligations arise under treaty law, 
customary international law and general principles of law.
80
     In regards to treaty law, as 
noted, obligations arising out of the UN Charter will be relevant and provisions in treaties that 
embody customary law or general principles of international law will also be important.
81
   
 
As a subject of international law, customary law and general principles of international law 
will be directly relevant and binding on the Bank.  But what are these norms the Bank is 
bound to honour?     There is considerable debate as to the customary nature of human rights 
law.  A number of parties have treated as customary the UDHR,
82
 among them the European 
Union,
83
 while others contend only parts of the UDHR could be considered customary.
84
 
Suffice to say there is little consensus.  Skogly argues plausibly, however, almost all rights in 
the UDHR have a “customary core” and, at the least, the Bank would be required respect this 
“core”.85  
 
A similar outcome stems from analysing duties arising under ‘general principles’ deriving 
from national or international systems.  General principles can be considered broader than 
customary law as they can also reflect situations where “a norm invented with strong inherent 
authority is widely accepted even though widely violated”.86  In this sense, it’s been argued 
the UDHR could more usefully be considered an expression of general principles of 
international law given the numerous references in, for example, UN documents, national 
constitutions and legislation.
87
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So what would this status of the UDHR as either customary law or general principles of law 
mean for the Bank?  This is a complex question that can only be touched on in this paper. 
There are a number of possible approaches.  In brief, one approach is through the concept of 
‘due diligence’ applying to subjects of international law.  This approach sees the Bank, as a 
subject of international law, under a positive obligation of vigilance in regard to activities 
under its control.
88
  This would require it to take positive action to ensure it avoids directly 
violating any human rights and avoids complicity in violations by another.
89
 In this regard it’s 
relevant to note the approach to “human rights due diligence” articulated in a new set of (non-
binding) UN Guiding Principles for business.
90
  Another approach is through the 
classification of rights obligations in terms of duties to ‘respect’, ‘protect’ and ‘fulfill’.91   
 
The duty to ‘respect’ is reflected the UN Charter and also arises from ‘general principles’.  It 
requires non-interference in the enjoyment of the right, but also involves a positive duty to 
prevent abuses.
92
  For the Bank it would mean ensuring its projects do not infringe basic 
rights of affected peoples or lead to loss of  enjoyment of  rights.  Skogly gives an example of 
the duty on the Bank to respect the right to education in the context of a Bank-funded project 
involving forced resettlement.   The primary obligation for the right to education would lie 
with the government, but the Bank would be under an obligation to ensure plans for the 
resettlement adequately provided for schooling at a standard, and to a timetable, that did not 
infringe the rights of the affected children.
93
 Thus, this would require a thorough assessment 
of standards before the move, follow-up monitoring to ensure plans were implemented, and 
follow-up with the government if, indeed, the plans did not achieve the same level of 
education  as previously existed.    For any resettlement project, therefore, a comprehensive 
analysis of all rights likely to be affected would need to be carried out at the earliest stages, 
including rights to housing, education, health and adequate standard of living.   This analysis 
would need to be incorporated into the plans; further assessments would be required during 
implementation and  after completion of the project.
94
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The obligation to ‘protect’ refers to positive action to prevent a third party under the control 
of the duty holder from violating rights.   This could be relevant for the Bank  in dealing with  
contractors, and where people come under threat after participating in consultations regarding 
projects,
95
 or when they seek to use the Bank’s complaint mechanism.  The latter has been an 
issue in a number of cases discussed below.  It could also be argued the Bank has protective 
duties to ensure the borrower does not violate the rights of affected people as it exercises 
certain control over how rights are protected  in terms of determining contractual obligations. 
That is, it has a protective duty to ensure it is not complicit in abuses.   The obligation to 
‘fulfill’ requires steps to be taken to ensure rights can be realized.    Normally, this is a state 
responsibility, but there may be circumstances where this would be relevant to the Bank 
where obligations arise from general principles or custom,
96
 particularly in regard to 
procedural rights.
97
  
 
2.6  Conclusion on obligations 
The above discussion indicates the Bank does, indeed, have international human rights 
obligations arising from its legal personality, its status as a specialised UN agency and an 
organisation comprising members with obligations.  Generally, the obligations will be 
grounded in customary and general principles of law. They arguably involve duties of due 
diligence and to respect, protect and, in some circumstances, fulfill rights.  It would appear 
these obligations have been acknowledged in internal Bank material, as noted, but not 
publicly by the legal department which has shied away from seriously examining this 
question.  The latter  may be seen as self-serving as such obligations give rise to duties on the 
Bank to take steps to meet these obligations.  It’s beyond the scope, and not the aim, of this 
thesis to discuss in depth the implications for the Bank of such a conclusion.  Rather this 
discussion provides a context for the main research questions; if the Bank, as contended, does 
have  binding obligations, the imperative to ensure its policy and practice is in line with 
international law is not just a matter of ‘good international citizenship’, rather it’s a matter of 
legal duty.   
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If my conclusion on the Bank’s duties in relation to human rights is not correct, it suggests a 
major gap exists in the international human rights protection system.    Regardless however,  
the following discussion would  still be important in terms of accountability for an 
organisation which, for better or for worse,  each year affects the lives of millions.   It would, 
indeed, be ironic if the Bank - that for some time now has stressed the importance of  
transparency, accountability and the rule of law for  the countries in which it operates - was 
not under binding obligations to observe human rights law and account for the impacts of its 
own work.   Indeed, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
clearly believes the Bank has a responsibility – moral, if not legal - to abide by international 
human rights: 
 
International agencies should scrupulously avoid involvement in projects which, for 
example … reinforce discrimination against individuals or groups contrary to the 
provisions of the Covenant, or involve large-scale evictions or displacement of 
persons without the provision of all appropriate protection and compensation … 
Every effort should be made, at each phase of a development project, to ensure that 
the rights contained in the Covenant are duly taken into account.
98
 
 
Even in the absence of  legal obligation, therefore, it can be argued it’s crucial the Bank 
actively observes the requirements of international human rights law for a range of normative 
and moral reasons,
99
 as well as its own credibility.  As the Legal Counsel for the International 
Monetary Fund has stated:  “If the international organisations are to be successful in this 
[developing sound frameworks for governance] task, they must be credible.  To be credible, 
they must apply the rule of law to their own situation, just as they encourage others to apply it 
to theirs”.100 In order to assess if the Bank is meeting the required international standards  
(whether it is legally obliged to or not) the next chapter will outline international human rights 
law as it relates to involuntary resettlement. 
                                                 
98
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3  The Involuntary Resettlement policy and human rights 
3.1 Operational  Policy 4.12 
The World Bank frankly acknowledges the real risk of impoverishment for people displaced 
by projects it funds.   Its Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement opens with the 
following statement:  “Bank experience indicates that involuntary resettlement under 
development projects, if unmitigated, often gives rise to severe economic, social and 
environmental risks.” 
 
The explicit aim of  OP 4.12 is to “address and mitigate” the risk of impoverishing affected 
people.  This means:
 101
 
● avoiding, if feasible, or otherwise minimising involuntary resettlement by exploring all 
viable project designs; 
● designing resettlement as a sustainable development project to ensure displaced persons 
benefit from the project and are meaningfully consulted; 
● assisting displaced persons improve their livelihoods and standard of living or “at least 
restore them, in real terms”. 
 
The policy  requires compensation at full replacement cost for lost assets, choices of 
relocation sites, information on rights and options, community participation in planning and 
implementing any resettlement, replacement housing or land at a standard at least equivalent 
to the old site, relocation assistance, support to restore livelihoods, as well as development 
assistance such as training or job opportunities.  The policy also calls for particular attention 
to be paid to the needs of vulnerable groups including women, children, landless people and 
ethnic minorities. It emphasises the particular complexities related to indigenous people and 
includes special provisions to apply when they are potentially affected.
102
 
                                                 
101
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Under the policy “displaced persons” are defined as persons “affected in any of the ways” 
described in paragraph 3  which covers “direct economic and social impacts”  resulting from 
Bank-assisted investment projects and caused by the involuntary taking of land. The impacts 
covered include relocation or loss of shelter, loss of assets or access to assets and loss of 
income sources or means of livelihood.  The “involuntary” nature of the resettlement 
immediately suggests an element of coercion.  The policy defines “involuntary” as actions 
that may be taken without the displaced persons informed consent or power of choice.
103
 
 
The former Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced People, 
Francis Deng, has described the Bank’s guidelines as an “important step in formulating 
requirements for projects that might lead to displacement”.104  But do these guidelines – that 
are meant to be binding on Bank staff and borrowers – accord with international human rights 
standards?  Do they lay a foundation to ensure the rights of people displaced  by development 
projects are fully respected?
   
Before tackling these questions, it’s important to consider what 
protections are provided by international human rights law for people who may find 
themselves in the path of development.   Among other issues, can they legally be evicted 
against their will for development purposes? 
 
3.2 Human rights law and  involuntary resettlement 
There is as yet no legally binding international treaty that provides specific and 
comprehensive rights to people whose lives and livelihoods are threatened by development 
projects.
105
  There are, however, a range of rights recognised in the International Bill of 
Human Rights
106
 relevant to involuntary resettlement.  While the UDHR is a non-binding 
instrument, as discussed above the rights contained in it arguably can be considered to have a 
“customary core” that will be binding on all states and other international legal subjects.  The 
two international covenants, on the other hand, have been widely ratified and are binding on 
the state parties - the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
                                                 
103
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(ICESCR) 
 
has 160 state parties, while the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)  has 164.  In the following outline of the law in this area, considerable 
reference is made to the General Comments of the Covenants’ treaty bodies.  These 
interpretations do not carry the force of law but are considered authoritative.107  The ICJ
108
 
and other adjudicators have favourably referenced the treaty bodies’ interpretations, including 
specific reference to General Comment No. 7 on forced evictions,
109
 discussed below. The 
principles articulated in Comment No. 7 have also been applied in numerous cases in Europe 
and Africa, particularly by South Africa’s Constitutional Court.110 Given space limitations 
this case law will not be explored here: suffice to say significant jurisprudence reinforcing 
rights relating to forced evictions, discussed below, has been developed by both courts and the 
treaty bodies themselves in their supervisory role.
111
   
 
3.2.1           Economic and social rights 
One of the most relevant provisions relating to forced evictions is contained in the ICESCR 
which recognises the right to adequate housing in Article 11(1).  The Covenant’s treaty body, 
the CESCR, has stated this incorporates the right to live in “security, peace and dignity,”112 
with all persons entitled to a “degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection 
against forced eviction, harassment and other threats”.113  It also incorporates the right not to 
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy, family or home.114  In its 
General Comment 4, the CESCR concluded that 
 
… forced evictions are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the 
Covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional circumstances, and in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of international law.
115
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The CESCR, however, did not define what it meant by “forced evictions” until 1997 when it 
revisited the right to housing.  Following what it said were numerous reports of forced 
evictions in violation of the Covenant, the Committee issued General Comment No. 7 
116
 
specifically examining this problem.  It noted that while the term “forced evictions” was 
somewhat problematic, it sought to convey a sense of arbitrariness and illegality.  It defined 
the term as “the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families 
and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, 
and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection”.117  Thus, the most crucial issue 
was not removal without consent, rather it was the absence of appropriate legal and other 
protections for affected people.  The CESCR emphasised evictions without these protections 
in place were prohibited under the human rights Covenants.  It noted legislation that provided 
security of tenure to occupiers of houses and land, and was designed to strictly control the 
circumstances under which evictions may be carried out, including penalties for private or 
public parties in breach, was initial evidence a state provided the necessary level of  
protection against arbitrary evictions.
118
    
 
Some evictions, therefore, would be lawful.   The Committee noted there could be situations 
where it would be reasonable to impose limits on the right to housing.  But in such situations 
the conditions set down in Article 4 of the ICESR  had to be met  – that is, firstly, the 
limitation  must be “determined by law” and be compatible with the nature of the  rights; and, 
secondly,  it must be “solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society”.119   Thus, this requires a legitimate legal system, the decision regarding displacement 
is taken by an authority empowered by law to do so, and the decision is solely motivated by 
the public benefit, objectively determined.
120
   Further, the wording “in a democratic society” 
in Article 4  suggests limits on such rights can only be justified  in countries where citizens 
enjoy rights of free expression and participation, with corresponding access to forums  to be 
able to defend their rights.
121
  Thus, it follows evictions carried out by force would be 
prohibited under the ICESCR  in states where those affected do not enjoy such rights and 
protections.       
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If eviction can be justified in “exceptional circumstances” for the public benefit, the 
Committee requires the following safeguards in place:
122
 
● protective legislation, referred to above; 
● any law authorising evictions must be “reasonable in the circumstances,”  in line 
with principles of  reasonableness and proportionality;   
● all feasible alternatives to eviction explored in genuine consultation with affected 
persons, with a view to avoiding or at least minimising the need for force; 
 ●  legal remedies; 
●  adequate compensation for any affected property (real or personal);  
● opportunities for genuine consultation; 
●  timely information and reasonable notice prior to eviction; 
●  government representatives to be present during eviction; 
●  provision of legal aid, where possible, for persons wanting redress from Courts; 
●  mechanisms to guard against discrimination.123 
 
These rights protected under ICESCR  are also backed up by a range of provisions in the 
UDHR protecting the right to adequate housing, property, and non-interference with home 
life, among others.
124
  Further, legal protections to guard against displacement are available 
for indigenous people under the ILO’s Convention No. 169.125   Protections under these 
instruments have also been reinforced in resolutions by the UN’s  Commission on Human 
Rights in 1993 and 2004, the former describing forced evictions as a “gross violation of 
human rights”.126  
 
3.2.2           Civil and political rights 
A range of civil and political rights are also relevant to forced eviction.  Article 17 of  the 
ICCPR complements the right not to be displaced without adequate protection, noted above, 
recognising the right to be protected against “arbitrary or unlawful” interference with a 
                                                 
122
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person’s privacy, family or home.  This provision specifically requires a state to have laws to 
protect against such interference
127
 and any intervention must be “reasonable in the particular 
circumstances”.128 This is also provided for in the UDHR in Article 12.  The ICCPR’s 
supervisory body,  the Human Rights Committee (HRC), in this regard specifically called on 
Kenya to develop transparent policies on evictions in Concluding Observations in 2005.
129
   
 
Article 12 of the ICCPR protects the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose 
one’s residence.130   Restrictions are only permitted to this right where they are specifically 
“provided by law, [and] necessary to protect national security or public order … or the rights 
and freedoms of others…”131  The HRC has noted  any restriction must be the least intrusive 
possible, and be proportionate to the interest protected.
132
  Thus, in the context of 
development projects, this right implies a rigorous assessment of the necessity of any 
development project involving forced eviction.   Indeed, as was stated in 1993 by the World 
Conference on Human Rights: 
 
While development facilitates the enjoyment of all human rights, the lack of 
development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement of internationally 
recognised human rights.
133
     
 
 The ICCPR also provides protections in relation to the right to life (Article 6) and security of 
the person (Article 9) – rights often violated by security forces or private armed guards taking 
action to move people forcibly or quell dissent.
134
 The UDHR also covers these issues.
135
  
Both these rights prohibit “arbitrary” actions that would threaten life or lead to arrest or 
detention.  In case of the latter, it must be open to the detained person to contest  the 
lawfulness of the action in a court.
136
  Thus again, an effective system of  law  is critical.   
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Remedies are also important for people affected by  projects.  A right to an “effective  
remedy” is provided for in Article 2(3) of the ICCPR.  It ensures any person whose rights are 
violated under the Covenant  shall have access to a competent domestic authority, if possible 
judicial, to determine the case and enforce remedies.  The UDHR (Article 8) also protects this 
right more generally.  Further, a set of  (non-binding) Basic Principles adopted by the General 
Assembly also emphasise the right to a remedy for  victims of  gross human rights violations, 
including effective access to justice and prompt reparations.
137
  
 
3.2.3           Minimum safeguards generally 
More generally, a number of soft law mechanisms exist to promote good practices related to 
displacement.  These include the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which “are 
consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law,”138 suggesting they could in 
part reflect customary and/or general law principles, particularly given their extensive use.
139
  
These principles state that the prohibition against arbitrary displacement includes large-scale 
development projects which are “not justified by compelling and overriding public 
interests”;140 thus setting a test for assessing the legality of forced evictions.  They also stress 
the requirement for authorities to explore “all feasible alternatives”.  Where no alternatives 
exist, “all measures shall be taken to minimise displacement and its adverse affects”.  The free 
and informed consent of those to be displaced must be sought (though this does not appear to 
require consent is given); full information provided on reasons, procedures, relocation sites 
and compensation;  and efforts must be made to involve those affected, particularly women, 
in the planning and management of their relocation. Affected people must also have the right 
to an effective remedy, including review of such decisions by judicial authorities.
 142
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In short, international human rights law provides a range of rights and protections for people 
facing development-related displacement.   Critically, they have the right not to be arbitrarily 
forced from their home.  In “exceptional circumstances” they can be forced to move, but only 
when certain conditions are met.  These include that any forced removal is authorised by law, 
proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances, and the development is solely for the 
general welfare in a society where people can exercise their basic rights.
144
  Legal protections 
must be in place, including access to adequate compensation and legal remedies to inter alia 
contest the legality of any eviction order.  Where these conditions are met, those affected  
have rights to be meaningfully consulted before the process starts with a view to avoiding or 
minimising displacement and to be further consulted and involved as the process proceeds.   
Where indigenous people are affected, more stringent conditions apply, including their 
mandatory participation in planning and implementing the development. 
 
 
3.3 Assessment of policy 
The Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement policy has been described as “perhaps the most 
progressive” of its type in the world.145   So do the Bank’s guidelines lay the foundation for it 
to meet international standards; does its policy comply with  human rights law?   On paper the 
policy would appear to meet many of the requirements of human rights law.  There are, 
however, a number of critical gaps and contradictory provisions that muddy the approach and 
potentially lead to violations of important rights. 
 
3.3.1           Avoiding involuntary resettlement 
Although OP 4.12’s first stated objective is to avoid involuntary resettlement where feasible, 
somewhat strangely the matter hardly rates a second mention.  The overwhelming focus of the 
policy is on resettlement, rather than the critical issue of trying to avoid the fact.
146
  As 
discussed, international law allows forced relocation only in “exceptional circumstances”. It is 
therefore crucial – and a requirement under international law - that all viable project 
alternatives that would avoid the need for evictions are comprehensively explored “in genuine 
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consultation with the affected persons”.147  The OP 4.12 does not mention this matter as it 
pertains to non-indigenous people outside the policy’s objectives.  The Bank’s corresponding 
procedures have one brief reference.
148
  The policy gives no detail as to how the Bank  
“satisfies itself”149  that all viable options have been explored and makes no mention of the 
need to consult affected people  on this issue.  The specific reference in relation to indigenous 
people in paragraph nine only highlights the lack of emphasis to this matter as it pertains to 
the general population.  In this regard, the  policy, arguably, falls short of what is required 
under human rights law.  
 
3.3.2           Guarding against arbitrary evictions 
A glaring omission of  OP 4.12 is its failure to guard against becoming involved with 
arbitrary evictions.  As noted, it virtually treats resettlement as a given; it gives no attention to 
whether the involuntary resettlement would even be legal under international law  This is an 
important issue for the Bank as many governments it deals with do not extend basic rights and 
protections to their citizens; and it most certainly has been associated with arbitrary evictions.  
Recent cases in Cambodia
150
 and Albania,
151
 discussed below, are prime examples.  
 
In countries lacking checks and balances on state power, such as an independent judiciary and 
rights to free speech, arguably any evictions are prohibited under international law.
152
  To be 
more specific, to accord with international law the policy would need to require the Bank to 
satisfy itself there was a “compelling and overriding public interest” justification for the 
project, laws were in place to guard against arbitrary eviction, any decisions regarding 
eviction were made pursuant to law,  and any affected persons could effectively  challenge 
such decisions in independent fora and freely express their opinions on the subject.   If 
citizens cannot exercise these rights, the guidelines would need to be clear the Bank could not 
be involved in the project unless the resettlement element was removed.   This would require 
                                                 
147
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the Bank to assess the political situation in the country, specifically the rights and freedoms 
enjoyed by the citizens, the independence of the judiciary  and issues of corruption.   Indeed, 
this is necessary to abide by the CESCR’s directive to international agencies, noted above,  
that “[e]very effort should be made, at each phase of a development project, to ensure that the 
rights contained in the Covenant are duly taken into account”.153  
 
3.3.3           Improving or restoring living standards? 
A key contradiction of the policy appears in its Objectives.  These laudably state resettlement 
should be conceived as a development project to ensure benefits for displaced persons, and 
then go on to  say that displaced persons should be “assisted in their efforts to improve their 
livelihoods and standards of living” (emphasis added).  However  - literally in the next breath 
-  they provide a  fallback  option – that of simply restoring livelihoods and living standards.   
It begs the question: what is the policy?    
 
There is clearly a big difference in philosophy and approach to the two options.  Indeed, 
global research has shown the ‘living standards restoration’ option is virtually guaranteed to 
leave most displaced persons worse off.
154
    Anthropologist Ted Scudder,  a former 
commissioner on the World Commission on Dams, says project authorities have tended to 
take the restoration option as it’s cheaper in the short term.    This, he says, is “the major 
reason why the Bank’s guidelines have played an impoverishing role in the past and … will 
continue to play such a role in the future”.155   Underlying the problem, he believes, is that 
compensation is given disproportionate emphasis in the guidelines: “[a]uthorities following 
the ‘restoration option’  tend to emphasise compensation …  as opposed to  providing the sort 
of development opportunities necessary even to restore livelihoods.”156 
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3.3.4           Fair compensation? 
The OP 4.12 does provide for “prompt and effective compensation at full replacement cost”  
for assets directly lost because of the project.   According to one analyst the policy’s  
guarantees relating to compensation cannot be overstated, given many domestic measures do 
not provide adequate compensation which, in turn, contribute to the failure of many 
development projects.
157
    However, the policy covers only “direct” economic and social 
impacts.
158
  This leads to understating total project impacts, including “critical costs of 
reintegrating and restarting disrupted economies, social institutions and educational systems” 
and a wide range of negative cultural and health effects related to loss of home, food security 
and control over one’s habitat. 159   These hardships - and real costs to affected people - are 
thus not likely to be compensated.   In footnote 5 the policy makes measures to mitigate 
“adverse” indirect impacts a matter of “good practice” only; that is, they are optional even 
when “poor and vulnerable” people are affected.  
 
3.3.5           Legal aid and access 
The policy requires “appropriate and accessible grievance mechanisms [be] established”.160   
But it doesn’t insist on access to independent courts to contest the lawfulness of any eviction 
order before displacement and legal aid to enable that to happen.  Anthropologist Ted 
Downing says the lack of  legal aid  “has consistently undermined the capacity of project-
affected people to understand and negotiate for their economic reconstruction”.161  In this 
regard he believes OP 4.12 “institutionalizes a negotiating system that potentially violates 
human rights”.  He points out the policy allows the Bank to underwrite the borrower’s cost of 
negotiating with the displaced, but not visa versa.
162
    In these matters the policy arguably 
falls short of what is required under human rights law. 
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3.3.6           Concluding comment on policy 
It could be argued the entire Involuntary Resettlement policy is aimed at protecting a range of 
rights from economic to political - and for this the Bank should be commended.  It is 
interesting to note the Bank’s Inspection Panel has found  “human rights implicitly embedded 
in various policies of the Bank”.163  In certain cases, the Panel has relied on this to justify 
examining the human rights implications of a project and assessing Bank performance against 
international standards.
164
  As discussed, there are a number of important gaps in the policy in 
meeting international standards.  However, the Panel has demonstrated (discussed below) that 
international standards are those by which the Bank can and should be held accountable. 
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4 The complaint system and human rights 
 
  The Panel’s work has a limited role and impact in international law as it is not 
permitted to address the project-related issues by applying the most advanced 
principles of … international law, mainly those related to human rights, environment 
and climate change.
165
 
 
This comment by the complainants’ representative in the  first case investigated by the World 
Bank’s Inspection Panel (‘Panel’) reflects some of the limits of the body set up  to provide 
independent oversight of the Bank’s lending activities.  As noted, the establishment of the 
Panel in 1993 was a breakthrough in international accountability as the Bank became the first 
international development financial institution to establish its own  ‘independent’ oversight 
body.
166
  Although it reports to the Board of Executive Directors (‘Board’), the Panel was 
primarily designed  to provide  public accountability;  it was created   “for the purpose of 
providing people directly and adversely affected by a Bank-financed project with an 
independent forum through which they can request the Bank to act in accordance with its own 
policies and procedures”.167   
 
4.1 Mandate and structure  
The Panel comprises three members appointed by the Board for five-year terms.   Its  key role  
is to investigate complaints from two or more people who claim to  have been harmed by 
Bank-financed projects, and then report its findings to the Board.  The complaint must relate 
to “serious” actual or threatened harm directly resulting from “a failure of the Bank to follow 
its operational policies and procedures”.168  After the complaint is received it’s sent to Bank 
management (Management) to respond; the Panel independently assesses the complaint and 
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Management’s response then recommends to the Board whether the matter should be 
investigated.   If  approved by the Board, the Panel conducts the investigation.  Its findings are 
presented to the Board and Management.  The latter then has six weeks to report to the Board 
on its response and actions it proposes to take; this usually takes the form of an ‘action plan’.  
The Board then decides on what action will be taken, in many cases adopting the ‘action 
plan’.169  
 
 So how effective is the Inspection Panel? Does the process respect the rights of  
complainants;  does it provide sufficient accountability and redress for those whose rights 
have been violated?    The Panel process undoubtedly has had a significant impact on the 
culture of the Bank and forced it to pay greater attention to its safeguard policies.  In many 
cases the Panel investigations have resulted in tangible outcomes for complainants. The Bank 
has completely withdrawn from some projects; this happened with the Arun power project in 
Nepal, the very first case investigated by the Panel,
170
 and a controversial Chinese project 
involving population transfers into a  Tibeten/Mongolian autonomous region.
171
  Other 
projects have been substantially modified and resettlement programmes improved.
172
 But 
there are some serious limitations in the Panel’s structure and  processes that clearly suggest 
while the Bank wants to be seen to be ‘doing something’, it does not want effective 
accountability. In 2001 the CECSR identified a standard for assessing human rights 
accountability mechanisms of international organisations; at a minimum they must be 
“accessible, transparent and effective”.173  As discussed below, despite best efforts by the 
Panel, the process falls well short of meeting this standard.  This chapter first looks at some 
structural issues limiting effectiveness, before examining Panel practices designed to enhance 
respect for rights.  
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4.2 Structural issues limiting rights 
4.2.1           Rough road to a remedy 
One of the glaring deficiencies in the complaint process is the lack of commitment by the 
Bank to a remedy for people harmed by its’ actions.  This is demonstrated in a number of 
ways.  Firstly, the Panel’s findings are not binding; it’s primarily an investigative body with  
no authority to order, or even recommend, a remedy.  It’s totally a matter of discretion for the 
Board, a political body comprising members with various competing interests, as to what 
actions, if any, it decides to take in response to the Panel’s findings.   
 
Secondly, and perhaps more concerning, is that in exercising this discretion the Board has 
deliberately restricted its own ability to adequately respond  by excluding the Panel from 
assessing and monitoring Management’s ‘action plans’ that are meant to rectify the problems,  
as will be discussed below. The Panel’s exclusion from this role is indeed odd as the Panel 
often spends many months investigating the complaint, including field visits, and clearly has 
expertise to assess Management’s proposals and inform Board decisions.      The irony of 
leaving Management, without oversight, to plan and report on remedies was not lost on one 
Brazilian claimant who commented that it belied “the concept of accountability to allow the 
creation and supervision of remedies to be conducted by the very same people … responsible 
for the violations in the first place”.174  
 
Indeed, an independent study has found that although the creation of ‘action plans’ by Bank 
staff has become more professional since 1999, a significant number of Panel findings of non-
compliance “still go unanswered”  by Management, leaving many requesters’ concerns 
unresolved.
175
  It was thus concluded that despite the Panel’s rigorous  investigations, “it is 
hard to sustain credibility when the right to complain and be heard is not matched by a right to 
a remedy”.176  
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4.2.2            Switching off the spotlight 
The lack of an independent monitoring role for the Panel to ensure any proposed remedial 
actions effectively address the problem is a key deficiency of the process.  As noted, this role 
was explicitly denied the Panel in a 1999 clarification by the Board:  “The Board should not 
ask the Panel for its view on … the action plans nor would it ask the Panel to monitor the 
implementation of the action plans.”177    While denying the Panel this role, the Board hasn’t 
created any other mechanism to do this.
178
  It begs the question: is the Bank afraid of finding 
out whether remedial action it commits to is implemented and/or effective?  Or as one 
claimant asked: “Does the Bank take its own Panel seriously?”179  The Panel itself is clearly 
disturbed by this constraint on its powers and has drawn attention to critics’ comments that 
this reduces accountability at the critical stage of taking positive reparative action, effectively 
“reducing the process to simply pointing out the Bank’s failures”.180    
 
Despite the clarification, there have been cases where the Board has requested the Panel to 
oversee actions being taken to rectify harms.  These included the Mumbai Urban Transport 
Project (‘Mumbai Project’) where the Panel had found serious policy violations regarding the 
resettlement of more than 120,000 people.  In that case the Panel carried out its monitoring 
role as an “independent fact-finding” assessment and its report documented many on-going 
problems.
181
  It was not asked by the Board, however, for a further follow-up report.  These 
cases, though, where the Board has specifically asked for Panel follow-up have been the 
exception, rather than the rule.  They demonstrate the Board does recognise the need for Panel 
follow-up for effective oversight, but they also highlight the Board wants to be selective about 
this level of accountability. 
 
In some cases a second request has been made to the Panel, alleging failure of the Bank to 
implement action plans resulting from an earlier request.  One concerned the Bujagali 
Hydropower Project in Uganda where the lead complainant expressed frustration at the need 
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to file a second complaint: “[the Panel] should keep informing the Board of the status – the 
Panel is not as helpful if they write a report and then forget”.182    In this and several other 
cases examined, an independent study found the situation improved while the Panel was 
watching then deteriorated again when the spotlight faded.
183
   
 
4.2.3           Restricted access 
A serious obstacle to accountability is an eligibility criteria that complaints cannot be heard 
by the Panel if the relevant Bank loan has already been at least 95 percent disbursed.
184
  This 
is potentially a major problem as loan funds are often disbursed early in the project cycle, but 
many problems relating to involuntary resettlement often come to light after this period.  
Thus, there is effectively no accountability for projects after this 95 percent cut-off date, the 
period when most of the implementation is taking place.
185
 This prevented the Panel 
considering a recent complaint filed in relation to a project in Cameroon.  In correspondence 
with the complainants the Bank had acknowledged on-going problems related to the forced 
eviction of about 500 people; the Panel noted in its report the “many significant concerns” of 
the Requesters and their perception the Bank had promised to deal with their problems [but 
had not].
186
 
 
A further criteria restricting access is a requirement the problem must have earlier been 
brought to Management’s attention. This was recently an issue in a Colombian case where the 
Panel ruled the complaint ineligible despite the fact it raised serious issues relating to 
involuntary resettlement.  The Requesters had raised their concerns with the government 
implementing body but not directly with the Bank during a supervision mission; the Panel 
noted the difficulty for the complainants to know “about the possibility of bringing their 
problems directly to the Bank and how to do it”.187 
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Indeed, the Panel has expressed frustration at the lack of effort by the Bank to raise awareness 
of both the Bank’s involvement in projects in borrower countries and the existence of the 
complaints mechanism.  Pursuant to the 1999 Second Review, Management is required to 
promote awareness of the Panel’s role.  However, the Panel states there has been “no 
systematic efforts” in this regard, compromising the participatory nature of the Panel process 
from the outset.
188
   
 
4.2.4           Participation - but not too much  
When the Panel completes its report, Management is given the opportunity to review the 
findings and make recommendations before the Board meets to consider the report.  The 
complainants, by contrast, are not even given access to the report before the Board meeting. 
This effectively limits complainants’ participation at this crucial stage, and creates a serious 
imbalance in access to the Board by the two sides of the dispute.
189
 This has been a major 
issue for complainants
190
  and others concerned that it fails to give affected people “a true 
voice in the outcome of the investigation”.191 
 
Also of concern has been the complainants’ lack of input into the ‘action plan’.  Observers 
have noted the Board tends to adopt these plans “ignoring the experience, knowledge, and 
preference of the people who triggered the process in the first place”.192  The Second Review 
of the Panel called for Management to consult with complainants before submitting ‘action 
plans’ to the Board.  However, the Panel itself has highlighted the fact that as the review did 
not allow disclosure of the Panel’s investigation report at this stage to the complainants, it’s 
clearly difficult for them to meaningfully engage in the preparation of remedial steps.
193
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4.2.5           Degrees of independence  
The Panel stresses the vital importance of ‘independence’ for  its operations.194 Yet it   
acknowledges it has been facing serious challenges in maintaining its “independence, 
integrity and impartiality”.195 One recurring problem has been the fact the decision as to 
whether an investigation should proceed is a matter for what is essentially a political body,   
the Board, not the Panel. In the Panel’s early years, Management directly lobbied Board 
members to prevent investigations proceeding, and in some cases was successful.
196
   In 1999, 
an agreement was reached whereby the Board would not question the Panel’s 
recommendation to proceed with investigation as long as the basic eligibility criteria was met.  
For a period after, the process worked smoothly.
197
  However, recently, within the space of a 
year the Board closely questioned the Panel over its recommendation on whether an 
investigation was warranted in at least four cases, instead of approval on a ‘non-objection’ 
basis as had become the practice.
198
  In a statement to the Board in one of these cases, a 
clearly frustrated Panel Chairman Robert Lenton concluded by saying: 
 
I would like to reiterate that the Panel is an instrument of the Board and as such, 
subject to its oversight and guidance.  To effectively perform its functions, however, it 
needs a degree of independence and credibility that up to now has been assured by 
this Board.
199
  
 
Not only does the Panel’s lack of decision-making power over investigations compromise its 
independence, it diminishes the Panel’s ability to be seen to be independent.200  
 
4.2.6           Limited mandate regarding rights 
The Panel is authorised only to investigate cases where it’s alleged that harm has resulted (or 
is likely to result) from the Bank’s failure to follow its own policies.  This focus on policy  
“excludes people affected by projects where policies may not have been directly violated, but 
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which have negative impacts nonetheless”.201  Given the Bank has no specific policy on 
human rights, this can potentially include serious rights violations. For example, in some 
cases projects have triggered political repression, but the Panel has been very cautious in 
exploring these matters because of sensitivities within the Bank about this “delicate topic”,202 
and the need to link it to Bank policy. This was  evident in the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum 
and Pipeline Project case where the lead complainant was tortured.
203
  This case is discussed 
further below; suffice to say here the Panel’s discussion on human rights issues concluded 
with the understatement that “the situation is far from ideal. It raises questions about 
compliance with Bank policies, in particular those  related to informed and open consultation, 
and it warrants renewed monitoring by the Bank”.204    Thus broader issues of responsibility 
for harms resulting from the project were not explored.
205
   
 
4.3 Panel practices  to enhance rights 
The Panel is very mindful of the limitations on its structure and  mandate which impact on the 
rights of affected people to access the complaints process, to participate in determining 
outcomes and, ultimately, to obtain a remedy.   It is also mindful many people have had their 
rights trampled – some very seriously - in trying to challenge the Bank by utilising the 
complaints process.
206
  The Panel has sought to overcome some of these shortcomings by 
conducting investigations that are widely viewed as thorough and fair
207
 and simplifying its 
processes as much as possible. Accordingly, complaints (known as Requests for Inspection)  
can be submitted as a simple handwritten letter in any language and do not need to refer to 
specific Bank policies; with information on the harm and alleged Bank failing, the Panel says 
it will make the links with policy.
208
 It has also developed  some practices to help mitigate its 
structural constraints and promote the rights of affected people, as discussed in the next 
sections. 
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4.3.1           Promoting effective remedies 
Aware that the main reason people trigger the Panel process is to seek a solution to their 
problems, the Panel has established procedures to enhance opportunities for problem solving, 
especially during the initial phases.  The idea is that once a complaint has been filed, the Bank 
has a strong incentive to explore solutions with complainants, thus avoiding need for a full 
investigation.  The Panel says this approach  is only adopted if complainants are in favour and 
the Panel believes Management is sincerely addressing the concerns. This approach has 
successfully resolved problems in a number of cases, but not others; it was successful in three 
recent involuntary resettlement cases
209
 – one in India and two in Kazakhstan – while it was 
not successful in the West Africa Gas Pipeline case, discussed below.  
 
Given the Panel’s core function of providing accountability through investigations, there are 
dangers of a conflict of interest. Serious problems may not be fully uncovered or understood 
without full investigation.  However, the practice promotes the prospect of an early remedy, 
and from the complainant’s perspective may be the preferred path. 
 
4.3.2            Mitigating  lack of  oversight 
The Panel clearly has been frustrated at its lack of oversight of Bank actions to rectify 
harms.
210
  To mitigate this shortcoming, since 2004 the Panel has established a practice of 
returning to the affected area after the Board meeting to brief complainants on the outcome of 
its investigation and Management’s response, including the ‘action plan’.  The idea is to 
ensure complainants are fully aware of the plan - and that it represents a ‘new commitment’ 
by the Bank - so they can continue to actively monitor it in a manner the Panel cannot.   
Informally in some cases - such as with the displaced Mumbai shopkeepers, described below -  
the Panel has continued to play a role by passing on information from complainants to the 
top-levels of the Bank.
211
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4.3.3           Promoting explicit respect for rights 
The Panel in a number of cases has explicitly tackled what it describes as the “sensitive 
subject”212 of human rights, thus injecting a more rights-based approach into the system.   The 
Panel, however, has been rather cautious regarding the issue, saying it was mindful of the two 
Shihata legal opinions, discussed earlier.
213
  
 
4.3.3.1           Confronting ‘sensitive subjects’ 
In examining the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline Project (‘Chad Project’) – the 
largest energy infrastructure project on the African continent - the Panel “for the first time”214 
felt obliged to look at human rights more directly.
215
  Governance and the human rights 
situation in Chad had been directly raised in the Request for Inspection by a complainant who 
said he’d been tortured because of his opposition to the project. His case had been 
documented by Amnesty International;  indeed, the Bank’s President  “on more than one 
occasion” personally   intervened to get the complainant and others  released from jail.216   In 
response to the complaint, Management had said it was constrained by the Articles to consider 
human rights issues unless they had a “significant direct economic effect” on the project; in 
this case it felt the project could “achieve its development objectives”, thus rights were no 
direct concern.
217
   
 
The Panel, however, took issue with Management’s “narrow view”.218   To the contrary, as 
noted, it found  human rights were “implicitly embedded” in Bank policies.219   Moreover, 
human rights analysis was relevant to determine if violations were “such as to impede 
implementation of the Project in a manner compatible with the Bank’s policies”.  The 
situation in Chad – where inter alia consultations had been held in the presence of armed 
soldiers - raised serious questions about Bank compliance with its policies, specifically those 
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relating to informed and open consultation.
220
    Panel Chairperson Edward Ayensu 
subsequently advised the Board: 
 
The human rights situation in Chad exemplifies the need for the Bank to be more 
forthcoming about articulating its role in promoting rights within the countries in 
which it operates. The Bank policies on consultation, among others, presume a basic 
respect for human rights … [and] perhaps this case should lead … to a study [of] the 
wider ramifications of human rights violations as these relate to the overall success or 
failure of policy compliance in future Bank-financed projects.
221
 
 
It would not appear as if that study has been undertaken – or at least not publicly released - 
but the Panel has clearly told the Bank it needs to adopt a far broader approach.  
 
4.3.3.2           Compliance with international treaties 
 In another case that directly raised human rights issues -  the Honduras Land Administration 
Project – the Panel made a number of potentially far-reaching comments and findings.  The 
case involved a claim by the indigenous Garifuna people that their rights to their ancestral 
lands would be harmed by the project that was aimed at reforming the country’s land tenure 
system.  One of their claims alleged the project violated the Government’s commitments 
under ILO Convention 169.  The Panel took care not to comment on the  Government’s 
actions in implementing the treaty, but found the Bank’s policy on project appraisal, OMS 
2.20, gave rise to an independent responsibility for the Bank to ensure the project plan and 
implementation was consistent with this treaty.
222
  This policy requires the Bank to ensure a 
project’s effects on the environment and “health and well-being” of the people do not violate 
any international agreements applicable in the project area.
223
 The Panel concluded the Bank 
had not adequately considered Convention 169 as required.
224
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In this case the Panel is clearly requiring the Bank  to ensure its projects are consistent with 
international agreements addressing human rights (as these naturally pertain to the “health and 
well-being” of citizens) when the relevant country is a signatory.225  It is significant this 
finding was made despite the objection of the Bank’s own legal counsel.226   Significantly, the 
Panel further noted both the ILO and the Bank were specialised UN agencies, providing “an 
additional reason” for the Bank to refrain from financing activities inconsistent with 
Convention 169.
227
  Here the Panel would appear to be implying moral, if not legal, duties. 
The Panel is thus stating the Bank should observe all UN treaties, and, by extension, 
declarations and guiding principles.  Together these provide a firm foundation for requiring 
the Bank to respect an array of rights based on the UN Charter, international conventions, 
related General Comments and judicial decisions.
228
  
 
4.3.3.3           Consistency with domestic laws   
In the Honduran case the Panel also indicated domestic laws were also relevant to an 
assessment of Bank policies,
229
 and in other situations this may used to protect human rights 
where local provisions are more strongly protective of rights.
230
   The context in the Honduran  
case was the Bank’s policy on Indigenous People which requires an assessment of the 
domestic legal status of indigenous groups and their ability to effectively use the legal system 
to defend their rights.
231
  The Panel thus noted “bank policies” recognised the “importance of 
the legal context in which a project was designed and implemented” and this required the 
Bank to analyse the impact of local laws to ensure they did not undermine protections 
provided for in Bank policies.
232
  Other Bank policies relevant to involuntary resettlement 
support the contention this works both ways ie. the Bank must abide by local standards if 
indeed they provide more protection than Bank policies.
233
   These include OP 4.01 that 
requires the environmental assessment to take into account the country’s overall policy 
framework and national legislation related to social (and environmental) aspects of the 
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project
234
, while OP 7.00 states the Bank “tries to work within existing law to the extent 
possible”.235 The Panel has implicitly approved this analysis.236 
 
4.3.3.4           Other approaches 
The Panel has also made other references to human rights that emphasise it will not allow the 
Bank to hide behind its Articles to avoid human rights issues.   Indeed, in the Chad Report, 
the Panel drew attention to the Bank’s own public rhetoric on the 50th anniversary of the 
UDHR that:     
 
 [T]he World Bank believes that creating the conditions for the attainment of human 
rights is a central and irreducible goal of development. By placing the dignity of every 
human being – especially the poorest – at the foundation of its approach to 
development, the Bank helps people in every part of the world build lives of purpose 
and hope …. And … the Bank has always taken measures to ensure that human 
rights are fully respected in connection with the projects it supports…237  
 
The logical conclusion from this is that the Bank should be held to its own professed 
standards, that is, to fully respect human rights.  Thus, it can be argued the Panel is entitled to 
interpret all substantive provisions of the Bank’s policies by international rights standards.  
Given the Panel drew attention to this statement indicates it should increasingly be prepared 
to do so. 
 
The Panel has also directly raised incidents of abuse and instituted steps, like confidentiality 
mechanisms, to try to boost protection for those involved in the complaint process.
238
   In 
these myriad of ways the Panel has been injecting a human rights perspective into its review 
of Bank activities; it has criticised the Bank’s ‘narrow approach’, called for the Bank to 
undertake a comprehensive study on the connections with its projects, highlighted the need 
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for more systematic assessments of risks of  a “political economy nature”239 and has indicated 
that, in a broad range of circumstances, it will hold the Bank accountable against  
international human rights standards.  
 
4.4  Conclusion on Inspection Panel 
There is little doubt the Panel is widely respected for its impartiality and investigative rigor.  
Even though it is only a quasi-judicial mechanism, Washington’s Centre for Environmental 
Law says the Panel’s reputation is such that its findings may be persuasive in other domestic 
or international human rights bodies.
240
   It has, however, been seriously constrained by its 
mandate and has had mixed results as a tool to promote accountability and ensure compliance 
with policies meant to protect the rights of those affected by development projects. 
 
The Panel has served as a useful tool to shed light on problems and has used its powers to 
confront the Bank with a broader analysis of the human rights implications of its work. In a 
number of its reports it has indicated the Bank needs a far “better” approach, as discussed 
further below.  But, despite its best efforts, the Panel cannot ensure a satisfactory outcome for 
those who resort to it for help; in short, while it plays a valuable role, it neither protects the 
right to a remedy nor effectively  holds the Bank to account.  In these critical structural areas 
it falls short of international standards. 
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5 Bank  resettlement practice and human rights 
 
So what is the current Bank practice on involuntary resettlement?  Is the Bank adhering to its 
policies when dealing with communities living in the way of developments it’s funding?  A 
number of analysts say the Panel undoubtedly has had a positive impact on Bank practices, 
inter alia focusing greater attention on the safeguard policies and need for compliance.
241
  In 
this regard it’s interesting to note that in its China Report in 2000, the Panel was alarmed to 
find among Bank staff a “disturbingly wide range of divergent and, often, opposing views” on 
how the operational policies should be applied, with some viewing them simply as “idealized 
policy statements”.242 In the intervening years, it’s to be hoped greater clarity and consistency 
has emerged in the way the Bank approaches involuntary resettlement, given the purported 
binding nature of the policies.  The Bank itself, however, has not carried out a comprehensive 
review of its resettlement projects since 1994,
243
 and there is no systematic reporting on the 
rehabilitation status of those displaced.
244
 A 1998 internal Bank study of eight major dam 
projects involving involuntary resettlement found the Bank had not effectively intervened to 
support income recovery, and only showed “intermittent interest” in providing follow-through 
support for resettlement, usually exiting the project before staff could even “determine the 
probability of reaching the Bank’s overarching objective of restoring or improving incomes 
and standard of living”.245 This chapter examines the Bank’s more recent practice through the 
lens of the Inspection Panel.    
 
Of the 76 formal requests received by the Panel to October 2011, almost half (38) alleged 
violations of the Involuntary Resettlement policy, among other issues.  Of these, 19 were 
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reported on, or received by, the Panel during the past six years.  These cases are the focus of 
this assessment of current  field practice.
246
  Of these, the Panel conducted full investigations 
in eight cases where one of the issues directly involved involuntary resettlement, while three 
cases were resolved to the satisfaction of Requesters without a full investigation.  The other 
cases had various outcomes or are still pending: see Annex A.  
 
A review of  these Panel cases points to some genuine efforts by the Bank to implement the 
Involuntary Resettlement policy adequately.  For example, in the Pakistan Project when the 
Government rejected provisions in the resettlement plan, earlier agreed with the Bank,  the 
latter withdrew funding from project components believed to require resettlement.
247
 
Nonetheless, serious – and indeed life-threatening – deficiencies in implementing the policy 
were uncovered by the Panel in that case due to, inter alia, a failure to fully identify those 
affected.  This is one of a number of systematic problems which would appear to continue to 
plague Bank practice involving involuntary resettlement;
248
 some key issues are  discussed 
below.   
5.1 Considering alternatives 
Inadequate attention to avoiding or minimising involuntary resettlement remains a recurring 
problem.
249
   In its investigation into the Mumbai Project the Panel identified a myriad of 
policy violations regarding the involuntary resettlement of more than 100,000 people to make 
way for the upgrading of the city’s transport system.250  The Panel received four separate 
complaints from people ranging from the very poor to middle-income shopkeepers who were 
to be displaced by the project.  The massive resettlement was initially planned as a separate 
operation but  later merged with the infrastructure project, and drastically scaled down. This 
was no small problem as the State-agency  that became responsible had  no staff experienced 
in resettlement planning.
251
   In their complaint, some shopkeepers demanded the road 
widening be limited to prevent their dislocation.  The Panel found they had been given no 
alternatives to designated resettlement sites for their shops and there had been no 
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consideration of alternative road alignments that may have made their displacement 
unnecessary, although possibilities existed.
252
   
 
The Bank also failed to consider alternatives in a recent case in Ghana involving a project to 
construct a sanitary landfill in Greater Accra (‘Ghana Project’).253 The project was 
vehemently opposed by the Agyemankata people who lived and worked around the 194 
hectare site.  The landfill would divide their community, with some forced to relocate while 
others would remain.  Despite their opposition, the Panel found the Bank had not considered 
any alternative sites that would have avoided  resettlement.  Site selection had largely been 
“taken . . . for granted” based on an outdated study done more than 10 years earlier when the 
environment was very different.
254
  
 
5.2  The challenge of restoring livelihoods 
A key aim of the Involuntary Resettlement policy is to ensure those forcibly displaced are not 
left impoverished; indeed, it promises to help them improve their livelihoods, or at least 
restore them.  This continues to be a major challenge for the Bank. 
 
In the Mumbai Project restoring incomes was not given any priority in the planning, such as it 
was. One particular group overlooked was hundreds of  shopkeepers and business people 
operating timber, metal, textile, automotive and other enterprises. Their needs were not 
properly assessed;  the smaller replacement shop areas offered made it difficult for some to 
run their businesses, while the poor locations meant most were likely to suffer a significant 
fall in income.  The resettlement site also lacked adequate water and had sewerage and 
pollution problems.
255
 
 
Indeed, in general, the Panel found the Bank had “paid scant attention to income restoration,” 
assuming jobs would not be a problem in the city.
256
  In contrast the Panel found  
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impoverishment was a major problem;
257
 many had lost jobs and income, especially women, 
small-scale traders and daily workers.  They also faced higher living costs, resulting in 
children being taken out of school and families losing power and water services when they 
could not pay their bills.
258
  It would appear there was no attempt to abide by the laudable 
policy goal to conceive the resettlement as a development project, with no training or other 
income-generating activities provided.
259
   The Panel also found the poor quality, or absence, 
of  baseline income surveys would, in any event, make it difficult for the Bank monitor 
income restoration as required under the policy.    As noted, this was one case where the Panel 
was given a role in monitoring Management’s activities to rectify the  problems.  Eighteen 
months later, however, the Panel reported the situation of the shopkeepers still had not been 
resolved.
260
 Regardless, the Panel was given no further formal monitoring role.  
 
Income restoration was also an issue in the West African Gas Pipeline Project (‘West Africa 
Project’).  Twelve communities affected by the project in Nigeria filed the complaint alleging 
it would inter alia damage their lands and destroy their livelihoods.   In Nigeria more than 
2,500 landowners and tenant farmers lost land to the project.  Complainants alleged many of 
those affected were not consulted and where compensation had been paid, in most cases, it 
was less than four percent of market rate.
261
  
 
In its initial response Management stated the project was well-prepared and met the Bank’s 
safeguard requirements.
262
  The Panel, however, found “significant flaws” in applying the 
Involuntary Resettlement policy, including a lack of necessary measures to avoid 
impoverishment.
263
  As in the Mumbai Project, the Panel found totally inadequate baseline 
data underlying the problem.   The complexities of the traditional land tenure system were not  
considered and the size of the affected population considerably underestimated.
264
  Although  
people lost land, they were not offered land-based options as a viable means of income 
restoration as emphasised in OP 4.12.  Rather they were given cash compensation at rates 
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one-tenth of that stated in the resettlement plan.   Further, the Panel found the plan 
“transferred the burden for restoration of livelihoods onto the displaced persons without 
providing additional assistance as called for in Bank policy”.265  As in the Mumbai Project, 
the requirement to design resettlement as a development project had been ignored.
266
  At the 
time of the Panel’s visit, Management had acknowledged the flaws in compensation. But it  
was still ignoring critical issues including consultation with affected persons, identification of 
vulnerable persons and assessment of whether cash payments were even appropriate to avoid 
project-induced impoverishment.
267
   
  
In its 2007 investigation of the Uganda: Private Power Generation (Bujagali) Project,  the 
Panel found  thousands of farming and fishing families forcibly moved during an earlier 
Bank-supported attempt to build a dam at the Bujagali Falls  were still suffering adverse 
effects in terms of their incomes and livelihoods.  These people were essentially “left in 
limbo” and did not receive key elements of the resettlement process when the Bank withdrew 
its support, and the Ugandan Government dropped the earlier project. Many expressed 
frustration over broken promises to restore their livelihoods, and failure to compensate for lost 
assets.  The Panel found the original resettlement plan had not made provision for helping 
those displaced restore incomes and the later project had failed to properly address these 
issues.
268
   Panel Chairperson Werner Kiene subsequently told the Board: 
 
…several key Panel findings are incompletely addressed in the [Management] 
Response and Action Plan including on resettlement … I am pleased that during the 
Board meeting Management has expressed a commitment to address the critical issues 
raised.  The Panel is optimistic that a Project costing several hundred million dollars 
can fully restore the livelihood losses among the 2,500 families who are inadvertently 
in its pathway.
269
 
 
In the Pakistan Project, too, no action was taken to assist thousands of extremely poor people 
even though they had been identified in a Bank fact-finding mission of being at “major risk” 
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of loss of livelihood
270
 due to project-related impacts.  As noted above (page one), these 
people had been completely left out of the ‘field of vision’ by project planners.271 A later 
Bank report had noted that as these affected people were politically and economically 
depressed they “would not be compensated unless an arm like the World Bank takes up their 
cause”.272 And yet it was not until the request was submitted to the Panel that Management 
devoted significant resources to develop “long-overdue” responses.273 
 
5.3 Failure to trigger policy 
In two recent cases, a key deficiency was the Bank’s failure to even trigger application of the 
Involuntary Resettlement policy as a safeguard for affected people.  The Panel says this has 
been a recurring problem.
274
   In both cases, the forcible evictions were not initially 
recognised as being associated with the Bank projects.  In one case involving Albania, 
Management went to considerable lengths to block information that proved otherwise.  In the 
second case, involving Cambodia, the Bank readily admitted the linkages after rumours 
surfaced of a complaint to the Panel.   
 
The Albanian case involved the eviction of a group of families living in Jale, a village along 
the southern coast. Most of the villagers had lived there for generations.  Those targeted were 
told they did not have building permits for their houses and were given notice by authorities 
their homes would be demolished. In 2007 the complainants alleged the demolitions had 
nothing to do with permits but were connected with a Bank-financed project - Albania: 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Clean-up Project (‘Albania Project’) – and carried 
out in violation of Bank policy.    Allegations were also made the demolitions were linked 
with corrupt officials who were using the project for their own purposes. 
 
Bank Management initially denied any link between the demolitions and the project; further it 
claimed that  before the project was approved, the Government had agreed to a moratorium on 
demolitions until  necessary protections were in place.
275
  The Inspection Panel, however, 
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found a rather different situation.  Firstly, it discovered the Government had not agreed to any 
moratorium; Management had misrepresented this fact in the project appraisal document, to 
the Panel and the Board.
276
  Secondly, the Panel  found  clear links between the project’s aims 
and activities and the Government’s demolition programme.277  It also uncovered – despite 
vigorous resistance from Management - significant documentary evidence directly linking the 
project to the demolitions.
278
    Furthermore,  an internal fact-finding mission sent to the area 
had failed to “find”  key facts, materially misrepresenting the situation.279    
 
The Panel concluded the Bank’s decision not to apply the Involuntary Resettlement policy 
had had “dire consequences” for the affected population, many of whom had lost their life 
savings. It argued the situation could have been prevented with a “better approach” 
incorporating, inter alia, a social assessment.
280
    Bank President Robert Zeollick did respond 
strongly to the Panel’s findings,  issuing the following statement: 
 
From basic project management to interactions with the Board and Inspection Panel, 
the Bank’s record with this project is appalling.  We take very seriously the concerns 
raised by the Inspection Panel and we are moving promptly to strengthen oversight, 
improve procedures, and help families who had their buildings demolished.  The Bank 
cannot let this happen again.
281
 
 
The President also asked the Bank’s Acting General Counsel to conduct an investigation  and 
the Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity to lead an Accountability Review into alleged 
misrepresentations by staff to the Board, Panel and others.  Following direct intervention from 
“the very top”, Management’s response to the Panel’s report fully acknowledged its serious 
errors.
282
  It proposed an ‘action plan’ including legal aid and support for the complainants to 
seek compensation through the Albanian courts and, significantly, if that process proved 
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unsatisfactory, to “reserv[e] the option” of directly compensating them. On this latter option it 
stressed, however, it was under no legal obligation to do so.
283
 
 
Yet, two years later the complainants still have not been compensated for the loss of their 
homes.  Management’s third progress report in 2011 indicates all cases are still bogged down 
in the courts.
284
  The report states the delays encountered are not “out of the ordinary” for 
Albania.
285
 Thus, the Bank does not yet appear ready to compensate those who lost their 
homes almost four years ago – at least in part because of its errors. Nor is it ready to admit 
any legal liability.  And while President Zeollick promised to “strengthen oversight,” the 
Board did not request the Panel to oversee implementation of plans to remedy the harms.   
 
In the more recent Cambodian case, the complaint was filed in 2009 by an NGO on behalf of 
a lakeside community comprising more than 4,000 families in Phnom Penh.   About 1,500 
families had already been forcibly evicted from the Boeung Kak Lake, while others were 
threatened with eviction to make way for a private urban development by a company owned 
by a ruling party senator.
286
  The complainants alleged these events were linked to the Bank-
financed Cambodia: Land Management and Administration Project (‘Cambodia Project’), a 
key component of which was the issuing of land titles in 11 rural and urban areas.
287
   
 
The area where the families lived was declared open for titling under the project in 2006. The 
families, however, claimed they were denied their rights to have their property claims 
considered as the area was later arbitrarily declared a “development zone” by the 
Government, a decision that went unchallenged by the Bank.  Although one of the aims of the 
project was to reduce land conflicts, areas “likely to be disputed”  and areas occupied by 
“informal settlers” were excluded from the titling system.288. These terms were not defined in 
the project documents - effectively providing a loophole for authorities to arbitrarily exclude 
areas from the titling process.  Thus claimants alleged the project had not only denied them 
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rights to gain formal land titles, but had  undermined their pre-existing tenure rights based on 
customary or informal tenure regimes.
289
   
 
The Panel essentially found the complaint fully justified, including a claim the Involuntary 
Resettlement policy should have been applied.    It found the families, and others throughout 
Cambodia, were denied access to a due process of adjudication of their property claims as a 
result of critical design faults in the project, and a lack of Bank supervision over many 
years.
290
   Key parts of the project specifically designed to protect the poor and vulnerable 
were mostly overlooked  including components to ensure legal protection for  those at risk of 
eviction.
291
 The Panel found Management had failed to act on information when the problems 
were first brought to its attention, only seriously engaging with the issue when rumours of a 
possible request to the Panel surfaced.
292
 By that time, the situation had “already deteriorated 
beyond repair”.293  It essentially found  lack of attention to the human rights context was at 
the core of Management’s failure to trigger the policy: 
 
Management’s attention to social consequences of land titling, including potential 
evictions, was not systematic … It is a matter of concern that several supervision 
missions concluded that there had been no situation requiring application of the 
Social and Environmental Safeguards… apparently without any careful scrutiny of the 
matter.
294
  
 
In response, Management drafted an ‘action plan’, emphasising cooperation with the 
Government in addressing  the harm caused to the  families.
295
  Gaining Government co-
operation on this, though, has been tough.  In 2009 when the Bank first raised its concerns 
with the Government over the evictions, the latter cancelled financing for the project.
296
 
Nonetheless, in this case, the Bank persisted; in August 2011 the Bank announced it would 
provide no further loans to Cambodia until the Government reached a satisfactory agreement 
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with the lakeside residents.
297
  A month later, it was reported the Prime Minister had agreed to 
award 12 hectares of the land to remaining families.
298
 It turned out later, though, not all 
remaining families were included in the plan and evictions, harassment and protests have 
continued.
299
 
 
5.4  Lack of  focus on  rights’  impacts  
These two cases  highlight, in a nutshell,  the lack of attention by the Bank to potential social  
impacts – particularly  rights abuses - in its projects.  The Panel itself has identified this as a 
systemic problem in projects involving regulatory reform,
300
 but the problem is far broader as 
the Chad, Mumbai, West Africa and Pakistan cases, among others, highlight. 
 
This, again, appears to reflect a narrow approach by the Bank in its seeming reluctance to 
fully analyse the social and political context of a project – including a rights assessment - 
which would enable it to more readily identify critical problems.
301
  For example, in both the 
Cambodian and Albanian cases, the political landscape clearly pointed to the risk of forced 
eviction stemming from the reforms being undertaken as part of the projects.    Indeed, in the 
Cambodian case the Panel in its report drew attention to the fact forced evictions had long 
been a well-documented human rights problem with some 150,000 Cambodians known to live 
at risk;
302
 somewhat remarkably, the project design and those implementing it had not 
seriously addressed this problem.
303
   
 
So in partnering with a government notorious for rights abuse,
304
 evictions in particular, it 
begs the question: how did those planning and implementing the project fail to adequately 
address this most glaring of issues? Arguably, only through a blinkered approach to potential 
harms related to its projects.  Given the Bank’s accountability mechanism has found it 
necessary in many cases to look at the broader picture – including the human rights situation -  
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in understanding harms caused by projects, the Bank would be well advised to adopt a similar 
perspective if it is not to be repeatedly found wanting. 
 
The need for broader perspectives and assessment was starkly highlighted in a recent case in 
the Congo where a Bank project promoting industrial logging failed in documents presented 
to the Board to even mention the indigenous pygmy population living in the forests and  
ignored the potential impact on the rural population of 40 million who largely depended on 
the forests for their subsistence.
305
 
 
5.5   Supervision deficit 
In all recent problem cases involving involuntary resettlement a lack of adequate supervision 
has been a core issue.  In many cases the problem has arisen when the Bank has effectively 
delegated responsibility for key functions associated with resettlement.   In the West Africa 
Project the Panel found the Bank had 
 
 …put too much faith in the project sponsor’s ability to handle complex social issues 
 in spite of the troubled history of some of the participating companies’ involvement 
 in the Nigerian oil and gas sector.
306
  
 
Indeed, the Bank had not even conducted any training for the sponsor’s staff on safeguard 
issues until after a complaint had been filed with the Panel.
307
  This had resulted in significant 
shortcomings, particularly in measures to avoid impoverishment.
308
 
 
In the Mumbai Project, the Bank’s failure to ensure adequate capacity of the implementing 
partner was also a major issue.   As noted, the government agency responsible for the 
resettlement lacked trained staff; almost all responsibility for resettlement was then delegated 
to NGOs.   The Panel found these lacked capacity and were ill-equipped to deal with “the 
overwhelming magnitude of the responsibilities transferred”.309  In the Pakistan Project, the 
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Panel found  Management’s supervision seriously wanting for, inter alia,  failing to consult 
with “down-stream affected people” for over half a decade, even though it was aware of the 
risk to their livelihoods, if not their lives, by serious technical problems with the project.
310
      
 
5.6 Lack of consultation 
Lack of adequate consultation and information to affected people was a common theme 
throughout virtually all the recent resettlement cases.  In some cases there was virtually no 
attempt at all to consult. In the Mumbai Project, Bank Management and the authorities 
maintained there were no alternative resettlement sites; effectively there was nothing to 
discuss. The 100,000-plus affected people were neither systematically informed nor consulted 
about their rights or options, and material available at special information centres was neither 
relevant nor in languages used by the affected populations.
311
 
 
The communities affected by the West Africa Project were similarly deprived of relevant 
information.  The Panel found no meaningful attempts were made to disclose information on 
the resettlement plan, including entitlements.  Indeed, a translation of the document into a 
local language was not done until about two years after the last compensation payments had 
been made.
312
 
 
5.7 Conclusion on practice  
These more recent Panel cases indicate the Bank still struggles in applying its Involuntary 
Resettlement Policy in the field; in the cases examined, its practice often falling well short of 
international standards.  In some cases, what should have been the key goal – exploring all 
feasible options to avoid resettlement – appeared to get very little attention. This arguably 
stems from lack of emphasis in the policy itself, but it also suggests a lack of real 
understanding of the whole rationale of the policy among those required to apply it.  The same 
could be said of the other critical anti-poverty goal – that of approaching any resettlement as a 
development project.   Even the policy’s “fallback” option of simply restoring incomes 
appeared to be a major challenge and the poor quality – or absence – of baseline studies in a 
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number of the cases studied, made it impossible for the Bank to know either way whether it  
had achieved this goal.   It’s disturbing project staff in the Mumbai Project felt that they did 
not need to pay attention to income restoration despite uprooting tens of thousands of people. 
It’s disturbing too so many adversely affected people in the cases examined were simply left 
off  ‘the radar screen’ and that staff on the Cambodia Project could ‘miss’ critical risks that 
regularly were headline news.
313
 This suggests a narrow economic focus that in spirit treats 
the policy as discretionary, rather than as binding guidelines; a focus that fails to seriously 
acknowledge  the potentially devastating harms projects can generate. 
 
 Caution needs to be exercised in trying to apply these findings to the Bank’s overall  practice 
on involuntary resettlement as these cases, as noted, are only those that came under the 
Panel’s spotlight.  To make any definitive conclusions regarding the Bank’s practice more 
generally, study of all recent projects involving involuntary resettlement – not only those that 
came to the Panel’s attention - would need to be undertaken. However, as the Panel has 
highlighted the Bank has done very little to publicise the Panel’s existence among those who 
may be affected by its projects, and it is unlikely these are the only problem cases. Further the 
Panel, drawing on its 17 years of experience, has itself identified many of the problems 
evident in these cases as “systematic issues”.314  Indeed, in its latest Annual Report the Panel 
notes an apparent lack of “due diligence” being paid to the safeguard policies as a result, inter 
alia, of the Bank’s incentive structure to ‘move the money’, and the Panel  highlights the 
pressing need for  “more systemic assessment of operational risks and risks of a political 
economy nature”.315    Certainly the findings  point to the need for the Bank to undertake a 
comprehensive review of all its projects involving involuntary resettlement from the past 
decade to fully identify the extent of - and to understand - the problems highlighted in the 
Panel cases.  
                                                 
313
 See eg. De Launey (2006) & (2008). 
314
 See Annual Report 2011,  11-12. 
315
 Ibid 12. 
  60 
 
6 Conclusion 
In crucial ways, the Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement policy, its complaints mechanism and  
field practice regarding resettlement (as evidenced in the cases studied) would appear to fall 
short of  the requirements of international human rights law.  The Bank deserves credit for 
taking the lead in developing an Involuntary Resettlement policy that provides many 
important protections.  However, as discussed, the policy has a number of weaknesses that 
undoubtedly have led to poor outcomes in the field.  The creation of the Inspection Panel too 
was an important, if somewhat forced, acknowledgement by the Bank that its responsibilities 
to avoid harm should be matched by accountability. The Panel has operated to shine a critical 
light on the Bank’s practice and has demonstrated it is willing and able in a range of 
circumstances to assess that practice by human rights standards.  Indeed, it has indicated that 
the Bank needs to adopt a far broader and more systematic approach to enable it to guard 
against harm and meet those standards.  However, the Panel cannot be seen as an effective  
accountability mechanism, with crucial decision-making power lying with the Board, a 
political body that has demonstrated it’s not committed to providing effective remedies and 
will only tolerate limited scrutiny.
 316
   It’s perhaps not surprising then the Bank’s field 
practice, in many of the cases examined, did not meet basic safeguards.   The Panel did find 
evidence of good practice, but in the cases studied too often the needs of those adversely 
affected  were not taken seriously until requests were made to the Panel. 
 
As noted, the question of whether the Bank’s policy and field practice meet international 
human rights standards is not an academic one, given the potentially devastating 
consequences.  It’s contended, however, that it is not simply a matter the Bank needs to 
address as a ‘good international citizen’.  Rather, the Bank has legal obligations under 
international law to address the shortcomings in its policy, complaint mechanism and practice.  
That is, it must revise its Involuntary Resettlement policy and restructure its complaint 
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mechanism to bring them into line with international rights standards.  For the latter this 
would mean inter alia ensuring that those harmed have access to effective remedies.   
 
What does it mean for the Bank in its field practice?  This is indeed a complex question that 
could only be touched on in this paper.  In short, though, at the least the Bank must exercise 
vigilance to ensure it does not contribute to human rights violations when involved with 
involuntary resettlement.  Certainly, as mentioned, the Bank firstly needs to understand the 
extent of the problems identified in the Panel cases and thus needs to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the human rights impacts of all its recent projects involving 
resettlement.  More generally, for each project due diligence would require, inter alia, 
comprehensive human rights impact assessments before, during and after its projects, with the 
findings  incorporated into each stage of the development.
317
  Only through such assessments 
and procedural checks would the Bank be in a position to systematically assess risks and 
monitor impacts – and, where necessary, act to ensure no loss of enjoyment of rights from the 
pre-project level with the core level of right as an absolute minimum.  
 
It is contended these are legal obligations but, in any event, the recent Panel cases suggest  
many critical problems could be avoided with a more direct focus on rights at critical stages 
of the project.  The cases involving Cambodia, Albania, Ghana, Nigeria, Congo, India and 
Pakistan are obvious examples.   Effectively such an approach helps shift the focus of analysis 
to the most deprived and excluded,
318
 with clear benefits for all parties.  In the early stages, 
for example, it would help clearly define the true costs of a project and help ensure that all 
affected people were taken into account.  While many within the Bank have studiously 
resisted using the ‘language of rights’ and facing squarely the question of its own legal 
obligations, it is apparent a more rights-oriented focus would indeed help the Bank comply 
with its policy and achieve its aim of sustainable development.
319
   More importantly, 
however, injecting human rights perspectives into the plans, policies and processes of the 
Bank could make a crucial difference  to the lives and livelihoods of  those millions literally 
driven from their homes each year in the name of development. 
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An afterword 
In Phnom Penh neighbours of those forcibly evicted under the Cambodia Project continue to 
fight for their homes - and in some cases, their lives - around the fast disappearing Boeung 
Kak Lake.  On 16 September 2011, excavators demolished the homes of eight more families 
who have tried to stand their ground in fighting eviction.  One protester was beaten 
unconscious amid a clash between residents and about 100 riot police and security guards 
who had arrived at the site without warning.
320
  Amnesty International says some of the 
residents were able to retrieve their belonging, others lost everything.
321
  Despite the sand 
pumped in by the company to fill the lake all around them, resident Heng Mom, is still  
hoping to stay: “We have raised money to rebuild our houses, but we cannot do it because the 
sand is [causing] flooding [on the land] … they are behaving very cruelly.”322  Unlike those 
evicted in the Albania Project, the World Bank has not indicated that, if necessary, it is 
willing to directly assist those evicted in Cambodia despite its contribution to the debacle. 
                                                 
320
 Amnesty International (2011);  Zarifi (2011).   
321
 Zarifi (2011) 
322
 Chansy (2011). 
  63 
 
 
7 References 
 
Case law 
 
Connors v United Kingdom, Application no. 66746/01 (European Court of Human Rights, 27 
May 2004). 
 
European Roma Rights Centre v Greece, Complaint No. 15/2003 (European Committee on 
Social Rights, 8 Dec. 2004). 
 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory 
Opinion)  [1980] ICJ Rep 73. 
 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion)  
[1971] ICJ Rep 16. 
 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion)  [2004] ICJ Rep  36. 
 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
 
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion)  
[1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre v Nigeria, Communication 155/96 (African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; 30th ordinary session, Oct. 2001).  
 
 
Inspection Panel reports 
 
Inspection Panel,  Albania: Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Clean-up Project 
Investigation Report  (Report No. 46596-AL, 24 Nov 2008).  
 
  --- Albania:  Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project Investigation Report 
(Report No. 49504-AL, 7 August 2009). 
  64 
  ---  Argentina: Santa Fe Infrastructure Project and Provincial Road Infrastructure Project 
Investigation Report (Report No. 49110-AR, 2 July 2009). 
  ---  Cambodia: Land Management and Administration Project Investigation Report 
 (Report No. 58016-KH, 23 Nov 2010). 
 
 ---   Cameroon Urban Development Project Notice of Receipt for Inspection and Decision 
Not to Register (No report no. avail., 9 May 2007). 
 
  ---   Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline Project  Investigation Report (No report no. 
avail., 17 July 2002). 
 
  ---  Chile:  Quilleco Hydropower Project Report and Recommendation on Request for 
Inspection (Report No. 56225–CL, 23 August  2010). 
 
 ---  China: Western Poverty Reduction Project Investigation Report (INSP/R2000-4, 28 April 
2000).   
 
  ---   Colombia:  Bogota Urban Services Project Report and Recommendation on Request for 
Inspection (No report no. avail.,7 January 2007). 
 
  ---   Democratic Republic of Congo: Transitional Support for Economic Recovery Credit 
Operation (TSERO) and Emergency Economic and Social Reunification Support Project 
(EESRSP) Investigation Report (Report No. 40746-ZR, 31 August 2007).  
  ---   Ghana: Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP II) Investigation Report 
(Report No. 47713-GH, 13 March 2009).   
 
  ---   Honduras Land Administration Project  Investigation Report (39933-HN, 12 June 
2007). 
 
  ---   India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project Investigation Report (Report No. 34725, 21 
December 2005).  
 
   ---   India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project  Progress Report (Report No. 39944, 5 June 
2007).  
 
  ---  India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project  Report and Recommendation on Request for 
Inspection (Report No. 49873,  7 August 2009).  
 
  ---   Kazakhstan: South-West Roads: Western Europe-Western China International Transit 
Corridor Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection (Report No. 55259-KZ, 28 
June 2010). 
  65 
  ---  Kazakhstan: South-West Roads: Western Europe-Western China International Transit 
Corridor Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection (Report No. 64964-KZ, 18 
October 2011). 
  ---  Lebanon:  Greater Beirut Water Supply Project Report and Recommendation on Request 
for Inspection (Report No. 59101-LB, 20 January 2011). 
  ---  Lebanon:  Greater Beirut Water Supply Project Follow-up Report to Board Decision of 
10 March 2011 (Report No. 63546-LB, 29 July 2011). 
 
  ---  Nepal: Proposed Arun III Hydroelectricity Project Investigation Report (No report no. 
avail., 21 June 1995). 
 
  ---  Nigeria: West African Gas Pipeline Project Investigation Report (Report No. 42644-GH,  
25 April 2008). 
 
  ---   Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project Investigation Report (Report No. 36382-
PK, 6 July 2006).  
  ---  South Africa: Eskom Investment Support Project Report and Recommendation (Report 
No.55231-2A, 28 June 2010). 
  ---  Tajikistan: Energy Loss Reduction Project (Rogun HPP, Tajikistan) Report and 
Recommendation on Request for Inspection (Report No. 58541–TJ, 23 December 2010). 
 
   ---   Uganda: Private Power Generation (Bujagali) Project Investigation Report (Report 
No. 44977-UG, 29 August 2008). 
 
  ---   Uganda: Third Power Project and the Proposed Bujagali Hydropower Project 
Investigation Report (No report no. avail., 23 May 2002). 
 
 
Treaties/statutes 
 
Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 15 November 1948. 
 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted  27 
June 1989, 76
th
 sess. ILO General Conference (entered into force 5 September 1991). 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for 
signature March 1980, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981).  
 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened 
for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969).  
  66 
 
IBRD Articles of Agreement, 1944. 
 
IDA Articles of Agreement, 1960. 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 19 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 November 1976).  
  
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
 
United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945 (entered into force 24 October 1945). 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 
27 January 1980). 
 
 
Declarations/Guiding Principles 
 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, 16 December 2005, A/RES/60/147.   
 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement, 5 
February 2007, A/HRC/4/18. 
 
Declaration on the Right to Development, 4 December 1986, GA Res 41/128.   
 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing  the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 21 March 2011, A/HRC/17/31. 
 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. 
 
The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic 
and Social Rights, 2 October 2000, E/C.12/2000/13. 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217A (III). 
 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 1993, A/CONF.157/23.  
 
 
  67 
General comments/resolutions/statements/policies 
 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 2: 
International Technical Measures, 2 February 1990, E/1990/23, annex III 86.   
    
--- General Comment No.4: Right to Adequate Housing (Art.11.1), 13 December 1991, 
E/1992/23.   
 
   --- General Comment No. 7: Right to Adequate Housing (Art.11.1) Forced Evictions, 20 
May 1997, E/1998/22, annex IV. 
 
   ---  Poverty and the ICESR, Statement adopted on 4 May 2001, E/C.12/2001/10.  
 
 
UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/77: 
Forced evictions, 10 March 1993, E/CN.4/RES/1993/77. 
 
    ---  Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/28: Prohibition of Forced Evictions, 16 
April 2004, E/CN.4/RES/2004/28. 
  
 
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16, Right to Respect of Privacy, 
Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation (Art. 17),  
23rd sess, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, 142, 2003 (8 April 1988). 
 
  ---  General Comment No. 27,  Freedom of Movement (Art. 12), 67
th
 sess, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9  (2 November 1999). 
 
 --- Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Kenya, 28 March 2005, 
CCPR/CO/83/KEN. 
 
 
World Bank, Bank Procedures 4.12 – Involuntary Resettlement, December 2001. 
 
  ---  Operational Policy 4.01 – Environmental Assessment, January 1999 (revised February 
2011). 
 
   ---  Operational Policy 4.10 – Indigenous People, July 2005. 
 
   ---  Operational Policy 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement, December 2001 (revised February 
2011). 
 
   ---  Operational Policy 7.00 – Lending Operations: Choice of Borrower and Contractual 
Agreements, February 2001. 
 
   ---  Operational Policy 13.05 – Project Supervision, July 2001. 
 
   ---  Resolution No. IBRD 93-10, 22 September 1993. 
 
   --- Resolution No. IDA 93-6, 22 September 1993. 
  68 
Literature/Reports 
 
Alfredson, Gudmundur and Rolf Ring (2001), The Inspection Panel of the World Bank: A 
Different Complaints Procedure (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). 
 
Alston, Philip and Gerard Quinn (1987), ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’  9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 156. 
 
Alston, Philip and Mary Robinson (eds) (2005), Human Rights and Development  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Amnesty International (2008), Rights Razed: Forced Evictions in Cambodia, AI Index: ASA 
23/002/2008, 11 February, available: www.amnesty.org. 
 
Amnesty International (2011), Cambodia urged to halt Boeung Kak Lake forced evictions in 
Phnom Penh, 19 September, available: www.amnesty.org 
 
Ayensu, Edward (2002),  Remarks of the Chairman of the Inspection Panel to the Board of 
the Executive Directors on the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Projects – Inspection Panel 
Investigation Report, 12 September (Washington DC: World Bank) available: 
www.inspectionpanel.org.  
 
Bartolome, Leopoldo  (et al) (2000), Displacement, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Reparation 
and Development, World Commission on Dams, Thematic Review 1.3, Working Paper.  
 
Barutciski, Michael (2006), ‘International Law and Development-Induced Displacement and 
Resettlement’ in Chris de Wet (ed), Development-Induced Displacement: Problems Policies 
and People (New York: Berghahn Books). 
 
Buergenthal, Thomas (1999), ‘The World Bank and Human Rights’ in E. Brown Weiss (et al) 
(eds) The World Bank, International Financial Institutions and the Development of 
International Law, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, No.31 (Washington DC: American 
Society of International Law). 
 
Blake, Conway (2008), Normative Instruments in International Human Rights Law: Locating 
the General Comment,  NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper, 
No.17, available: http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/wp/blake.pdf. 
 
Bleicher, Samuel (1970), ‘UN v IBRD: A Dilemma of Functionalism’ 24 International 
Organization 31.  
  
Bradlow, Daniel (1996), ‘The World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights’ 6 Transnational Law 
& Contemporary Problems 47.   
  69 
 
  ---   (2005), ‘Private Complainants and International Organization: A Comparative Study of 
the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International Financial Institutions’ 36 
Georgetown Journal of International Law  403.   
 
Bridgeman, Tess (2007), An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank Inspection Panel: 
Summary of Findings and Recommendations, available: 
http://baseswiki.org/en/An_Independent_Evaluation_of_the_World_Bank_Inspection_Panel,_
Tess_Bridgeman,_2007.  
 
Bridgeman, Natalie and David Hunter (2008), ‘Narrowing the Accountability Gap: Toward a 
New Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism,’ 20 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 187. 
 
Broding, Gernot (2001), The World Bank and Human Rights: Mission Impossible? Carr 
Centre for Human Rights Policy Working Paper T-01-05.  
 
Brownlie, Ian (2008), Principles of Public International Law (7
th
 ed, Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (2009), Losing Ground Forced Evictions and 
Intimidation in Cambodia, September, available: http://www.chrac.org. 
 
Carrasco, Enrique and Alison Guernsey (2008), The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: 
Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration,   available: 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ibl/documents/SSRN-id1104718.pdf. 
 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (2009), Request for Inspection by World Bank 
Inspection Panel, 4 September,  available: www.inspectionpanel.org.  
 
Cernea, Michael (2009), ‘Financing for Development; Benefit –Sharing Mechanisms in 
Population Resettlement’ in Development and Dispossession: The Crisis of Forced 
Displacement and Resettlement (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press).  
 
Chansy, Chhorn (2011), ‘B Kak Families Sue – and Sued by – Government Officials’ 
Cambodia Daily, 5 October, available: http://saveboeungkak.wordpress.com. 
 
Clapham, Andrew (2006), Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
  70 
Clark, Dana (2002), ‘The World Bank and Human Rights’ in 15 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 205. 
 
Clark, Dana,  Jonathan Fox and  Kay Treakle (2003), Demanding Accountability: Civil-
Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield).    
 
 Clark, Dana  (2008), ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (New York: 
Cambridge University Press).  
 
  ---  (2009), ‘Power to the People’ in Development and Dispossession: The Crisis of Forced 
Displacement and Resettlement (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press).   
 
Danino, Roberto (2005), ‘Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s Work on Human Rights’ in 
Alston and Robinson (eds), Human Rights and Development (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press).   
  --- (2006), Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank (Washington, 
World Bank). 
 
Darrow, Mac (2003), Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law  (Portland: Hart Publishing). 
 
De Feyter, Koen (2003), ‘Self-regulation’ in Willem Van Genugten, Paul Hunt and Susan 
Mathews (eds), World Bank, IMF and Human Rights (Nijmegan: Wolf Legal Publishers).  
 
De Launey (2006), ‘Cambodia’s “out of control” evictions’ BBC News, 29 September,  
available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5392474.stm. 
 
   ---  (2008) ‘Cambodia protest over land grabs’ BBC News, 10 December, available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7135827.stm 
 
De Wet, Chris (2009), ‘Does Development Displace Ethics? The Challenge of Forced 
Resettlement’ in Anthony Oliver-Smith (ed), Development and Dispossession: The Crisis of 
Forced Displacement and Resettlement (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press). 
 
Deng, Francis (1998), Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General,  Compilation 
and Analysis of Legal Norms, Part 11: Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection against 
Arbitrary Displacement,  UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.1. 
 
  71 
Downing, Theodore (2002), ‘Creating poverty: the flawed economic logic of the World 
Bank’s revised involuntary resettlement policy’ 12 Forced Migration Review (Oxford:  
Refugee Studies Centre).  
 
Eide, Asbjorn (1987), Special Rapporteur, Report on the right to adequate food as a human 
right, UN Doc E/CN4/Sub 2/1987/23.  
 
Fawthrop, Tom (2011), ‘Phnom Penh residents score landmark victory over proposed land 
grab’ The Guardian Online, 14 September, available:  http://www.guardian.co.uk. 
Fountain, Henry (2005), ‘Unloved, but not Unbuilt’,  New York Times (Week in Review) 5 
June, 3, available: www.nytimes.com. 
 
Fox, Jonathan and David Brown (eds) (1998), The Struggle for Accountability: The World 
Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press) . 
 
Gianviti, Francois (2001), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper submitted to UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/WP  (5,7  May) available: www.perjacobsson.org. 
 
Grimsditch Mark and Mark Henderson, (2009) Untitled Tenure Insecurity and Inequality in 
the Cambodian Land Sector (Bridges Across Borders South East Asia, Cambodia, Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions, Switzerland,  and Jesuit Refugee Service, Cambodia).   
 
Herbertson, Kirk, Kim Thompson and Robert Goodland (2010), The Roadmap for Integrating 
Human Rights into the World Bank Group, (Washington, World Resources Institute). 
 
Herz, Steven and  Anne Perrault (2009), Bringing Human Rights Claims to the World Bank 
Inspection Panel (Washington: Centre for International Environmental Law, Bank 
Information Centre and International Accountability Project). 
 
Horta, Korinna (2002) ‘Rhetoric and Reality: Human Rights and the World Bank’ 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 227. 
 
Hoshour, Kate  and Jennifer Kalafut (2007),  A Growing Global Crisis Development-induced 
Displacement and Resettlement, International Accountability Project Issue Paper, available: 
www.accountabilityproject.org. 
 
Hunter, David and Lori Udall (1994), ‘The World Bank’s New Inspection Panel: Will It 
Increase the Bank’s Accountability?’ CIEL Brief, No.1 (Washington: Centre for International 
Environment Law) available: www.ciel.org. 
 
  72 
Hyll-Larsen, Peter (2010), The Right to Education for Children in Violent Conflict, Paper 
commissioned for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011, The hidden crisis: 
armed conflict and education, available: www.unesco.org. 
 
Inspection Panel (2009), Accountability at the World Bank, The Inspection Panel at 15 years 
(Washington DC: World Bank). 
 
  ---  (2001) The Inspection Panel Annual Report, August 1, 2000 to July 31, 2001 
(Washington DC: World Bank). 
 
  ---   (2010) The Inspection Panel Annual Report, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010 
 (Washington DC, World Bank).    
 
  ---   (2011) The Inspection Panel Annual Report, July 1, 2010 to June 30,  2011 (Washington 
DC, World Bank). 
 
Janis, Mark (1993), An Introduction to International Law (2
nd
 edn, Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co). 
 
Johnston, Barbara (2009), ‘Development Disaster, Reparations and the Right to a Remedy’ in 
Development and Dispossession: The Crisis of Forced Displacement and Resettlement  (Santa 
Fe: School for Advanced Research Press).  
 
Klein, P (1999) ‘La responsabilite des organizations financiers et les droit de la personne’  
Revue Belge de Droit International 97. 
 
Langford, Malcolm and Jean du Plessis (2005), Dignity in the Rubble? Forced Evictions and 
Human Rights Law, Center on Housing Rights and Evictions, Working Paper, available: 
www.escr-net.org. 
   
Langford, Malcolm (ed) (2008), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law (New York: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Langford, Malcolm (2010), ‘A Sort of Homecoming: The Right to Housing’ in Gibney and 
Skogly (eds) Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations (University of 
Pennsylvania Press). 
 
Lenton, Robert (2010), Statement of Mr Robert Lenton, Chairman of the Inspection Panel 
Read at Board Meeting on South Africa-Eskom Investment Support Project – Report and 
Recommendations, 29 July (Washington: World Bank) available: www.inspectionpanel.org.  
 
Morse, Bradford  and Thomas Berger (1992), Sandar Sarovar: The Report of the Independent 
Review (Ottawa: Resources Future International). 
 
  73 
Oliver-Smith, Anthony (2009a), ‘Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement: A 
Global Human Rights Crisis’ in Development and Dispossession: The Crisis of Forced 
Displacement and Resettlement (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press).  
 
  ---  (2009b), ‘Evicted from Eden: Conservation and the Displacement of Indigenous and 
Traditional Peoples’ in Development and Dispossession: The Crisis of Forced Displacement 
and Resettlement (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press).  
 
Oloko-Onyango J and Deepika Udgama (1999), Human Rights as the primary objective of 
international trade, investment and finance policy and practice, Working Paper submitted in 
accordance with Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities resolution 1998/12, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/11. 
 
Palacio Ana (2006), The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank (Washington DC: 
World Bank) available: www.worldbank.org. 
 
Penz, Peter (2002), Development, Displacement and ethics, in 12 Forced Migration Review 
(Oxford:  Refugee Studies Centre).  
 
Pettersson, Bjorn (2002), ‘Development-induced displacement: internal affair or international 
human rights issue?’ in 12 Forced Migration Review (Oxford:  Refugee Studies Centre).  
 
Phnom Penh Post (2011), ‘World Bank Blunder’ Phnom Penh Post, 10 March, 1. 
 
Prak, Chan Thul (2011), ‘World Bank stops funds for Cambodia over evictions’ Reuters, 9 
August. 
 
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan (2001), ‘The Violence of Development’ The Washington Post, 
Editorial, 9 August, A19. 
 
Rew, Alan,  Eleanor Fisher and Balaji Pandey (2000), Addressing Policy Constraints and 
Improving Outcomes in Development-Induced Resettlement Projects (Centre for Development 
Studies, University of Wales Swansea). 
 
Robinson, Courtland (2003), Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences and Challenges of 
Development-Induced Displacement (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution). 
 
  74 
Roquet, Vincent and  Carine Durocher (2006), Compensation Policy Issue Final Report, 
United Nations Environment Programme: Dams and Development Project Compendium of 
Relevant Practices - 2
nd
 Stage, available: www.unep.org. 
 
Rosas, Allan (1999), ‘The Role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the treaty 
relations of the European Union’ in Baehr, Peter, Cees Finterman and Mignon Senders (eds) 
Innovation and Inspiration: Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
(Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences). 
 
Schermers, Henry and Blokker, Niels (1995), International Institutional Law: Unity Within 
Diversity, (3
rd
 edn, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). 
 
Scudder, Thayer (2005),  The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Environmental, 
Institutional and Political Costs  (London: Earthscan). 
 
Shihata, Ibrahim (1990), Issues of ‘Governance’ in Borrowing Members: The Extent of Their 
Relevance Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, Legal Memorandum of the General 
Counsel, reproduced in Ibrahim Shihata (2000), The World Bank Legal Papers (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff). 
 
  ---  (1991), The World Bank in a Changing World Selected Essays (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff).  
 
  ---  (1995), Prohibition of Political Activities in the Bank’s Work: Legal Opinion by the 
Senior Vice President and General Counsel,  reproduced in Ibrahim Shihata (2000), The 
World Bank Legal Papers (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). 
 
  --- (1997), ‘Democracy and Development’ 46 International Law and Comparative Law 
Quarterly  635. 
 
  --- (2000), The World Bank Legal Papers (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). 
 
Simma, Bruno and  Philip Alston  (1989), ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles’ 12 Australian Year Book of International Law 82. 
 
Skogly, Sigrun (2001), The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (London: Cavendish Publishing). 
 
  ---  (2003) ‘The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and IMF’ in Willem van 
Genugten, Paul Hunt and Susan Mathews (eds), World Bank, IMF and Human Rights 
(Nijmegan: Wolf Legal Publishers). 
 
  75 
Sohn, Louis (1982), ‘The New International Law: The Protection of Individuals Rather than 
States’ 32 American University Law Review 1. 
 
Treakle, Kay  (undated), ‘The World Bank and ESC Rights’ in Circle of Rights: Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights Activism (University of Minnesota Human Rights Resource 
Centre) available: http://www1.umn.edu. 
 
Udall, Lori (2008) Statement of Lori L. Udall regarding the World Bank Inspection Panel 
Update and Recommendation for Reform in the Context of the Fifteenth Replenishment of the 
International Development Association (Before the Committee on Financial Services, US 
House of Representatives, 18 June) available: 
http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/udall061808.pdf. 
 
Wolfensohn, James (2005), ‘Some Reflections on Human Rights and Development’ in Philip 
Alston and Mary Robinson (eds), Human Rights and Development  (New York: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
World Bank (1994), Resettlement and Development: The Report of the Bankwide Review of 
Projects involving Involuntary Resettlement  1986-1993 (Washington DC: World Bank). 
 
  --- (1996), ‘International Agreements on Environment and Natural Resources: Relevance 
and Application in Environmental Assessment,’ Environmental Assessment Sourcebook (Vol. 
1): Policies, Procedures and Cross-sectoral Issues, World Bank Technical Paper No 139, 
Environment Department (Washington DC: World Bank).   
 
  --- (1998a), Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank, Internal Working 
Group Report, (Washington DC: World Bank) available: www.worldbank.org. 
 
  ---  (1998b), Recent Experience with Involuntary Resettlement, Operations Evaluation 
Department, Report No. 17538,  (Washington DC, World Bank), available: 
www.worldbank.org. 
 
  --- (1999), Conclusions of the Board’s Second Review of the Inspection Panel, BP 17.55, 
Annex C, available: www.inspectionpanel.org.  
 
  ---  (2002), Chairman’s Statement on Chad Investigation, 12 September,  available:  
www.inspectionpanel.org.  
 
  ---  (2005), World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (New York: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
  ---  (2008), World Bank Board Discusses Investigation by the Independent Inspection Panel 
of Power Project in Uganda, News Release,12 December available:www.inspectionpanel.org. 
  76 
 
  --- (2009a), World Bank Board of Executive Directors Reviews Independent Inspection 
Panel Report on Coastal Zone Management Project in Albania, Press Release, Washington, 
17 February,  available: www.inspectionpanel.org.     
 
  ---  (2009b), Management Report and Recommendation in Response to the Inspection Panel 
Investigation Report; Albania Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Clean-up Project 
(18 February [sic]) available: www.inspectionpanel.org.  
 
  ---  (2011a), Progress Report No. 3 Implementation of Management Action Plan in Response 
to Inspection Panel Investigation Report Albania: Integrated Coastal Zone Management and 
Clean-up Project (16 February) available: www.inspectionpanel.org. 
 
  ---  (2011b), World Bank Board of Executive Directors Considers Inspection Panel Report 
on Cambodia Land Management and Administration Project,  News Release, 8 March, 
available: www.inspectionpanel.org. 
 
Zarifi, Sam (2011), ‘Boeung Kak Shows the Ruinous Impact of Forced Evictions’ Cambodia 
Daily, 4 October, available: http://saveboeungkak.wordpress.com. 
 
 
 
  A 
8                                       Annex A 
List of cases reported on, or received, by the Inspection Panel from 
January  2005 to October 2011 where involuntary resettlement was 
raised in the Request for Inspection. 
 
1.  India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project 
Requests received: 28 April 2004/29 June 2004. 
Status: Full investigation and Board request for one progress report. 
Investigation Report: 21 December 2005 (Report No. 34725). 
Progress Report: 5 June 2007  (Report No. 39944). 
 
2. Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project 
Request received: 10 September 2004.  
Status: Full investigation.  
Investigation Report: 6 July 2006   (Report No. 36382-PK). 
3. Democratic Republic of Congo: Transitional Support for Economic Recovery 
Credit Operation (TSERO) and Emergency Economic and Social Reunification 
Support Project (EESRSP) 
Request received: 19 November 2005. 
Status: Full investigation, but Involuntary Resettlement policy not discussed in         
investigation; assessed in light of other policies including Indigenous People policy.    
Investigation Report: 31 August 2007  (Report No. 40746). 
 
 
  B 
 
4.  Nigeria:  West African Gas Pipeline Project 
Request received: 27 April 2006. 
Status: Full investigation. 
Investigation Report: 25 April 2008 (Report No. 42644-GH). 
5.  Uganda: Private Power Generation (Bujagali) Project 
Request received: 5 March 2007. 
Status: Full investigation. 
Investigation Report: 29 August 2008 (Report No. 44977-UG). 
6. Albania:  Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project 
Request received: 30 April 2007.  
Status: Full investigation but involuntary resettlement was not included in the                                                 
scope of the investigation as not considered relevant. 
Investigation Report: 7 August 2009 (Report No. 49504-AL). 
7. Albania: Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Clean-up Project  
Request received: 30 April 2007.  
Status: Full investigation.  
Investigation Report: 24 November 2008  (Report No. 46596-AL). 
 8. Ghana: Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project 
Request received: 16 August 2007. 
Status: Full investigation.  
Investigation Report: 13 March 2009  (Report No. 47713-GH). 
 
  C 
9.  Cameroon: Urban Development Project and Second Urban Project 
Request received: 5 September 2007. 
Status: Request not registered; ruled ineligible as more than 95 percent of project funds 
disbursed. 
Notice of Receipt of a Request for Inspection and Decision Not to Register: 5 September 
2007.  
10.  Argentina: Santa Fe Infrastructure Project and Provincial Road 
Infrastructure Project 
Request received: 13 September 2007. 
Status:  Full investigation, but matters involving involuntary resettlement largely 
resolved during early problem solving and not subject of full investigation. 
Investigation Report: 2 July 2009 (Report No. 49110-AR). 
11.  Colombia: Bogota Urban Services Project  
Request received: 30 October 2007. 
Status:  Request not registered; ruled ineligible as failed to satisfy procedural criterion 
that Requesters had brought the matter to attention of Bank management. 
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: 7 January 2008 (Report No. not 
available). 
 
12.  India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project (5
th
 request) 
Request received: 29 May 2009 
Status:  No investigation as matter resolved to satisfaction of requesters during early 
problem solving. 
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: 7 August 2009   (Report No. 
49873). 
  D 
13.  Cambodia: Land Management and Administration Project 
Request received: 4 September 2009. 
Status:  Full investigation. 
Investigation Report: 23 November 2010 (Report No.58016-KH). 
14.  South Africa: Eskom Investment Support Project 
Request received:  6 April 2010. 
Status:  Full investigation: investigation ongoing. 
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: 28 June 2010  (Report 
No.55231-2A). 
Comment: Full Board discussion on Panel recommendation. 
15.  Kazakhstan: South-west roads: Western Europe-Western China International 
Transit Corridor 
Request received:  24 April 2010. 
Status:  No investigation as matter resolved to satisfaction of requesters during early 
problem solving. 
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: 28 June 2010   (Report No. 
55259-KZ). 
16.  Chile:  Quilleco Hydropower Project 
Request received:  26 May 2010.  
Status:  Investigation not recommended as issues raised were found not to relate to 
World Bank funded project. 
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: 23 August  2010   (Report No. 
56225 - CL). 
 
 
  E 
17.  Tajikistan: Energy Loss Reduction Project (Rogun HPP, Tajikistan) 
Request received:  8 October 2010.  
Status:  Investigation not recommended as Panel can only investigate matters related to 
Bank-financed activities and the Bank was only financing the Assessment Studies for a 
restructured hydropower plant; most issues raised by the request related to the 
hydropower plant, rather than the study.  
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: 23 December 2010   (Report 
No. 58541 - TJ). 
Comment: Board discussion on Panel’s recommendation. 
18.  Lebanon:  Greater Beirut Water Supply Project 
Request received:  2 November 2010. 
Status:  Investigation recommended by Panel on issues not involving Involuntary 
Resettlement policy. Board requested full discussion on Panel’s recommendation and 
later  “invited” Panel to await decision of a Management-commissioned study before 
making final recommendation on investigation. Panel subsequently reported it would 
await further developments and report to Board in early 2013. 
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: 20 January 2011   (Report No.  
 59101-LB). 
Follow-up Report to Board Decision of 10 March 2011: 29 July 2011 (Report No. 
63546-LB). 
Comment: Full Board discussion on Panel recommendation. 
19.  Kazakhstan: South-West Roads: Western Europe-Western China 
International Transit Corridor 
Request received:  15 June 2011. 
Status:  No investigation recommended as requesters satisfied that their concerns had 
been resolved or were about to be resolved. 
Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: 18 October 2011   (Report No. 
64964-KZ).  
